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Abstract
We develop a parsimonious model to study the equilibrium structure of over-the-
counter securities markets. We show that regulations aimed at reducing counterparty
risk and improving liquidity can be inefficient. Such regulations have a direct posi-
tive effect on entry in those markets, thus fostering competition and lowering spreads.
Greater competition, however, has an indirect negative effect on market making prof-
itability, this effect being stronger on more efficient intermediaries. Thus, general equi-
librium effects result in reduced incentives of all intermediaries to invest in efficient
technologies and can cause a social welfare loss. The equilibrium outcome is consis-
tent with some empirical findings on the effects of post-crisis regulations and with the
observed resistance by some market participants to those regulations.
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1 Introduction
Many markets operate through market makers or similar intermediaries. Two elements are
most important for market making, counterparty risk and the cost of holding inventories.
Both elements have been or will be affected by the G20-led reform to the over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives market following the financial crisis. As part of this reform, G20 Leaders
agreed in 2009 to mandate central clearing of all standardized OTC derivatives. Currently,
although central clearing rates have increased globally, there still is a significant proportion
of OTC derivatives that is not cleared centrally.1 As the regulatory framework is being
implemented, and as changes in the infrastructure landscape for trading and settlement take
place (e.g. due to Brexit), little is known about the effects of these reforms on the structure
of the markets in which they are implemented.
In this paper, we analyze the effects of introducing measures aimed at reducing counter-
party risk and improving liquidity, such as central clearing (?, pg. 7), on the structure of
financial markets. One may expect that initiatives aimed at reducing such risk would bring
uncontested benefits. However, in line with the theory of the second best, we show that such
initiatives may to some extent “back-fire”: market makers may take actions that can yield
to inefficient outcomes. For instance, they may have too little incentive to innovate.
We use a simple set-up with market makers intermediating trades between buyers and
sellers. Dealers are heterogeneous, as they can be more or less efficient at making markets.
For a (fixed) cost they can invest into a market making technology which lowers their ex-
pected cost of intermediating trades. This technology stands in for more efficient balance
sheet management, a larger network of investors, etc.
Once they decide to invest, dealers post and commit to bid and ask prices. Buyers and
sellers sample dealers randomly and decide whether to trade at the posted bid or ask, or
whether they should carry on searching for a dealer next period. The search friction implies
that the equilibrium bid-ask spreads will be positive. Also, even less efficient dealers will be
active because buyers and sellers may be better off accepting an offer which they know is not
the best on the market rather than waiting for a better offer. Therefore, our search friction
defines the structure of the market measured by how many and which dealers are operating,
1See ? Review of OTC derivatives market reforms, June 2017, pg. 2-14, Figures 2,3.
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and its liquidity measured by the distribution of bid-ask spreads.
Contrary to ?, dealers are exposed to the risk of having to hold inventories. To make
markets, dealers have to accommodate buy-orders with sell-orders. However we assume that
buyers (and sellers) can default after placing their orders. If dealers can perfectly forecast
how many buyers will default, they will just acquire fewer assets. Otherwise they may find
themselves with too many assets in inventory for longer than expected. For simplicity, we
make the extreme assumption that market makers cannot sell the asset if the buyer defaults.
In this sense, the asset is bespoke. Dealers maximize their expected profit by posting bid-
ask spreads that depend on the inventory risk as well as on their cost of intermediating
transactions (in the model, a dealer’s idiosyncratic transaction cost). Due to these costs,
less efficient dealers may find it optimal to stay out of market making activities.
We then analyze the effects of regulations aimed at lowering counterparty risk and im-
proving pricing2 on the liquidity and the structure of intermediated markets. In particular,
we focus on (i) the measure of active dealers, buyers and sellers, (ii) the share of the market
that each dealer services, and (iii) the equilibrium distribution of bid-ask spreads. Such a
comprehensive characterization of the equilibrium allows the identification of gainers and
losers from such regulations.
1.1 Model and results
We model regulations as a reduction in the severity of counterparty risk which affects dealers’
inventory risk. Intuitively, dealers should benefit from a reduction or elimination of inventory
risk. This could be implemented by the introduction of central clearing in the market for an
asset, for example, a more liquid secondary market for the asset, a better functioning of the
inter-dealer market as in ?, or the use of an insurance mechanism between market makers
(e.g. credit default swaps (CDS) market).3
Everything else constant, a reduction in counterparty risk will result in a reduction of
the bid-ask spread. Two distinct mechanisms are responsible for the lower spread. First,
2 See the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) reports on the swap regulation introduced
by Title VII, Part II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and buyer Protection Act, and ? pg.3, 22.
3In Appendix ?? we provide a full characterization of the mapping from a reduction in counterparty risk
to the introduction of central clearing.
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facing a lower default risk, dealers prefer to charge a lower mark up per transaction and
execute a larger volume. Second, lower counterparty risk increases competition by inducing
less efficient dealers to enter the market. As a result, the measure of dealers active on the
market increases and more buyers and sellers are served. More efficient dealers however have
a lower profit because they lose some market share to lesser efficient dealers. In fact, the
most efficient dealers would prefer some counterparty risk as long as other dealers are not
fully insured against such risk.
We also analyze the impact of a reduction in counterparty risk on dealers’ incentives
to adopt a market-making technology that lowers their ex-ante intermediation cost. Pro-
tection against risk can induce dealers to opt for a worse market making technology. As
discussed, reducing risk allows less efficient dealers to enter the market. This additional
competition reduces profits of more efficient dealers (ex-post), and lowers the incentives to
invest in the better market-making technology. If the fixed cost of the better technology
is too high, dealers will prefer not to invest to become ex-ante more efficient. In turn the
entire pool of dealers becomes worse. This adversely impacts buyers and sellers who face
worse terms of trade on average. As a consequence, the introduction of a seemingly bene-
ficial insurance mechanism against counterparty risk reduces welfare of buyers and sellers,
unless dealers receive a transfer that compensate their investment into more efficient market
making technologies.
This paper thus makes two contributions: first it explains the opposition of some deal-
ers to tighter regulation, such as mandatory central clearing for all standardized derivatives
traded OTC.4 Second, it argues that forcing the adoption of seemingly beneficial regula-
tion can have adverse consequences on welfare by affecting the incentives of some market
participants.
1.2 Related literature
The literature on the microstructure of markets is large and has been mostly interested with
explaining bid-ask spreads. It is not our intention to cover this literature here, and we refer
4Dodd-Frank Act for example, ?. European financial markets legislation has also been moving in the
same direction.
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the interested reader to ?. Among the first to study the inventory problem of market makers
are ?. Here, we are not interested in the inventory management problem per-se as much
as in how the cost of managing inventories affects liquidity. In particular, we normalize the
optimal size of inventory to zero and we analyze how the probability to experience deviations
from this optimal inventory level affects liquidity.
Our paper, by focusing on the effect of competition on the adoption of better market-
making technologies, is also related to ? and ?. Following the seminal contribution of ?, ?
analyzes the effect of competition on bid-ask spreads and liquidity, and shows that liquidity
traders might prefer to trade with a monopolist market maker. ? study the effects of com-
peting platforms when there is a risk of default. They show that a monopolist intermediary
may ask for relatively little guarantee against the risk of default.
The papers that are most related to ours are the equilibrium search models of ? and
?, which we extend by introducing inventory risk through the default of buyers. ? present
an environment where market makers are able to trade their inventory imbalances with
each other after each trading rounds. Therefore, market makers never carry any inventory
in equilibrium. We depart from ? by assuming that market markets may have to hold
inventories and we study the effect of regulations, whose goal is to make market makers
closer to the set-up in ?, on the structure of the market. In an environment similar to
?, ? shows that competitive market makers offer the socially optimal amount of liquidity,
provided they have access to sufficient capital to hold inventories. ? shows that if market
makers face a capacity constraint on the number of trades which they can conduct, then
delays in reallocating assets among investors emerge, thus creating a time-varying bid ask
spread, widening and narrowing as market makers build up and unwind their inventories.
In contrast to the last papers, we analyze the incentives of dealers to enter market making
activities in the first place. In this respect, our paper is also related to ?, who study the
incentives of ex-ante heterogenous banks to enter and exit an OTC market. This allows
? to identify the banks which behave as end users versus the banks which intermediate
transactions, and thus behave as dealers. In contrast, we analyze the impact of current
OTC market reforms on dealers’ entry and investment decisions, and on the efficiency of the
resulting equilibrium allocation.
In the empirical literature, there is strong evidence that inventory costs and spreads are
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tightly related: ? find that losses on inventories widen effective spreads for firms trading
individual NYSE stocks; ? finds that dealers’ inventory financing costs widen bid-ask spreads
in the US corporate bonds market. Moreover, our results are consistent with empirical
findings on the effects of mandatory central clearing for Credit Default Swaps indexes in the
United States. Studying separately the effects of each implementation phase of the Dodd
Frank reform, ? find that the effect of central clearing on a measure of transaction-level
spread is significantly different according to the category of market participants affected
by the reform. In particular, central clearing is correlated with an increase in spreads for
swap dealers and with a decrease in spreads for commodity pools and all other swap market
participants.5 In our model, the final general equilibrium effect of introducing an insurance
mechanism against counterparty risk (e.g. central clearing) crucially depends on features of
the market participants involved.
Section 2 describes the basic structure of the model. To understand the basic mechanism
underlying our main results, we analyze the equilibrium with no counterparty risk (i.e.
settlement fails) in Section 3 and the equilibrium with counterparty risk/settlement fails in
Section 4. Section 5 contains our result about the incentives of market makers to invest in
a more efficient market making technology ex-ante. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Dealers and Risk
We base our analysis on a modified version of the equilibrium search models in ? and ?.
The presentation of the model follows closely the one in ?. There are three types of agents:
traders, who can be either buyers or sellers, and dealers. Buyers and sellers cannot trade
directly an asset and all trades must be intermediated by dealers.
There is a continuum [0, 1] of heterogeneous, infinitely-lived, and risk neutral buyers,
sellers, and dealers.6 A seller of type v ∈ [0, 1] can sell at most one unit of the asset at an
opportunity cost v. A buyer of type v ∈ [0, 1] can hold at most one unit of the asset and
is willing to pay at most v to hold it. A buyer consumes the asset on the spot. Buyers
and sellers engage in sequential search: they obtain a single price quote from one dealer,
5See ?, Table 10 and Appendix A.2.1, pg. 667-9.
6In Appendix ?? we analyze a version of this model with risk averse traders.
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drawn randomly from the distribution of dealers who are active in the market. A dealer
of type k ∈ [0, 1] can execute a trade at cost k. Specifically, k denotes the marginal cost
of processing a seller’s order. As we discuss in detail below, we assume that a dealer must
process a seller’s order before the buyer’s order is settled.7 The most efficient dealer can
process trades at cost k = 0. 8
Dealers face no counterparty risk in ?, as dealers’ clients exit the market after they settle
their claim. Contrary to ?, we introduce counterparty risk for dealers by assuming that
buyers first place orders with dealers, but then exit the market with probability λ before
they have the chance to settle their orders. A buyer who exits the market is replaced with a
new buyer whose type v is drawn from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. We do not consider
strategic default and λ is exogenous. Thus we abstract from issues related to asymmetric
information and counterparty monitoring, and interpret counterparty risk as settlement risk.
9 Differently from buyers, sellers always settle their orders. 10
In and of itself, this type of counterparty risk is aggregate and not interesting: There is
nothing a dealer can do to insure against it. So we also assume that dealers face idiosyncratic
risk: Nature does not allocate buyers perfectly across dealers who can be in two states, s = 1
and s = −1. In state s = 1, a dealer has a measure λ− ε of his buyers exiting the market,
while in state s = −1 a measure λ+ ε of his buyers exit. This default shock is independent
of whether the buyers placed an order at the bid-ask spread posted by the dealer. Dealers
cannot observe state s before it occurs: They only observe the actual measure of buyers
exiting the market once that is realized. This shock is i.i.d. and each state occurs with
probability 1/2 , so that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Notice also that on average
buyers exit the market before settlement with probability λ.
At time t = 0, the initial distribution of types of buyers and sellers is v ∼ U [0, 1].
7This introduces an asymmetry regarding the cost of dealing with a buyer or a seller, which can be
justified in real contracts as the cost of handling the asset underlying the contract. Our results would be
substantially identical if we introduced a handling cost of the buyer as well, kb as long as kb < k. Here we
set kb = 0. For financial contracts, this is the cost of designing the contracts.
8We relax this assumption in Section ?? and allow dealers to be uniformly distributed on a truncated
support k, 1 with k > 0.
9This is akin to focusing on the risk that a counterparty defaults on an order for reasons that are
independent of its trading activities.
10This asymmetry between buyers and seller is not substantial. Analogous results would arise if sellers
exited the market before settlement.
7
Since the type of newborn agents is drawn randomly over the same distribution, then the
distribution of types will also be U [0, 1] in all subsequent periods t = 1, 2, 3, .... Therefore
U [0, 1] is the unique invariant distribution of types in each subsequent period t = 1, 2, 3, ....
In equilibrium, only dealers who can make a profit will operate a trading post and there
will be a threshold level of trading cost, k̄ ≤ 1, such that no dealer with a cost greater than k̄
operates a post. A dealer of type k ∈
[
0, k̄
]
chooses a pair of bid-ask prices (b (k) , a (k)) that
maximizes his expected discounted profits. A dealer is willing to buy the asset at price b (k)
from a seller and is willing to sell the asset at the ask price a (k). We consider a stationary
equilibrium so that b(k) and a(k) will be constant through time.
Buyers and sellers engage in search for a dealer. Each period, if he decides to search, a
trader gets a price quote from a random dealer. Since dealers post stationary bid and ask
prices depending on their types, traders face distributions F (a) and G (b) of ask and bid
prices. These distributions are equilibrium objects. Traders discount the future at rate β.
Timing, also shown in Figure ??, is as follows: At time 0, dealer k ∈
[
0, k̄
]
chooses bid
and ask quotes. ∀t ≥ 0, buyers and sellers decide whether they want to search or not. If so,
they contact a dealer at random, and they either accept the quoted price or keep searching.
If they agree, they place an order to buy/sell a unit of the asset. Then each buyer exits
with probability λ. Moreover, if a dealer is in state s ∈ {−1, 1}, then a measure λ − sε of
his buyers exit before settlement. Finally, settlement occurs: Each operating dealer receives
assets from the sellers who placed an order and delivers one asset to each of the (1− λ+ sε)
buyers who settle their orders. Dealers must dispose of the surplus of assets.11
The main difference between our model and those in ? and ? is that while in those
models buyers exit the market after they trade, we allow buyers future trading opportunities
after they trade in a given period. Thus, in our model, trading decision of buyers and sellers
are simpler. A common feature between our environment and those in ? and ? is that each
active dealer has a higher probability of intermediating funds when few dealers operate. This
is key to our results.
11We could assume that dealers gets some value p̄ for each unit of asset they hold and we normalize p̄ = 0,
so that the asset fully depreciates in the hand of the dealers. This low holding-value also stands in for high
regulatory costs of holding some assets (such as higher capital requirements).
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t
Measure λ
of buyers
and sellers
is born
Dealer k
chooses
a(k), b(k)
Buyers and Sellers
choose:
- randomly
contact a dealer
- never search
Buyers and Sellers
who contacted
a dealer choose:
- accept b(k), a(k)
(i.e. place an order)
- reject and search
next period if no exit
Buyers
die
w.p. λ
Settlement
and
consumption
take place
t+ 1
Figure 1: Timing
3 No settlement risk
To gain some intuition, in this section we study the benchmark economy where there is no
settlement risk so that λ = 0. The decision of buyers is simply to accept the selected ask
price a whenever v ≥ a and reject otherwise. When facing ask quote a, their payoff is
Vb(a, v) = max
(
v − a+ βVb(v), βVb(v)
)
(1)
(2)
and before receiving a quote, their expected payoff from searching for a dealer at the begin-
ning of each period is
Vb(v) =
ˆ v
a
(v − a)dF (a) + βVb(v) (3)
where a is the lowest ask price. Similarly, the decision of sellers is to accept the selected bid
price b whenever v ≤ b and reject otherwise. Their payoff is
Vs(v) =
ˆ b̄
v
(b− v)dG(b) + βVs(v)
9
Dealers that post an ask-price a face the following demand
D(a) =
1
N
ˆ 1
a
dv =
1
N
(1− a) (4)
where N denotes the measure of active dealers. Only those buyers with a value greater than
the posted price will accept the offer. Similarly, dealers that post a bid-price b face the
following demand
S(b) =
1
N
ˆ b
0
dv =
1
N
b (5)
A dealer of type k maximizes his profit by choosing a and b, subject to the resource constraint,
or
Π(k) = max
a,b
{aD(a)− (b+ k)S(b)}
subject to D(a) ≤ S(b). The resource constraint will bind, so that b = 1 − a and a dealer
chooses a to maximize
Π(k) = (1− a)(2a− 1− k)
with solution
a(k) =
3 + k
4
(6)
b(k) =
1− k
4
(7)
Notice that, as in the models of ? and ?, the distribution of bid and ask prices are
uniform on
[
a(0), a(k̄)
]
and
[
b(k̄), b(0)
]
because the bid and ask prices are linear and the
distribution of dealer cost is uniform.
In equilibrium, all dealers with intermediation cost k such that Π(k) ≥ 0 will be active.
Therefore, all dealers with k ≤ k̄, where k̄ is defined so that Π(k̄) = 0, will be active. So
the measure of active dealers is N = k̄. It is easy to see that k̄ = 1, a(k̄) = 1, and b(k̄) = 0.
Therefore the least efficient dealer is indifferent between operating and staying out of the
market. In fact, dealer k̄ would face a measure zero demand at the price a(k̄) = 1. Any
10
dealer k < k̄ = 1 makes strictly positive profits:
Π(k) =
(1− k)2
8N
=
(1− k)2
8k̄
.
Then we can find the extremes of the support of the bid and ask price distributions:
a = a(k̄) =
3 + k̄
4
= 1 a = a(0) =
3
4
b = b(0) =
1
4
b = b(k̄) =
1− k̄
4
= 0
Clearly, each dealer charges its monopoly price: The bid/ask prices posted by other
dealers do not influence the decision of traders to accept or reject the price they obtain as
traders can anyway search again next period, independently of their decision today. So,
differently form the models in ? and ?, traders do not forfeit the option of getting a better
deal tomorrow if they accept the proposed deal today. Since dealers charge the monopoly
price, even relatively inefficient dealers (those with large values of k) can make profits, which
implies that they have the incentive to enter the market: Hence we should expect that the
equilibrium number of active dealers is too high relative to what a planner would choose.
We analyze this next.
To characterize the optimal number of dealers, we now define the surplus of dealers,
buyers and sellers as a function of k̄. Total economy-wide profits, or surplus of dealers, are:
Sd(k̄) =
ˆ k̄
0
Π(k)dk =
ˆ k̄
0
(1− k)2
8k̄
dk
=
3− (3− k̄)k̄
24
which are always decreasing in k̄ ≤ 1. The surplus of buyers is:
Sb(k̄) =
ˆ 1
a(0)
[ˆ a(k̄)∨v
a(0)
(v − a)
a(k̄)− a(0)
da
]
dv
=
(3− (3− k̄)k̄)
96
=
Sd(k̄)
4
11
Hence, Sb(k̄) is always decreasing in k̄. Finally, the surplus of sellers is
Ss(k̄) =
ˆ b(0)
0
[ˆ b(0)
b(k̄)∧v
(b− v)
b(0)− b(k̄)
db
]
dv
=
(3− (3− k̄)k̄)
96
=
Sd(k̄)
4
Hence Ss(k̄) is always decreasing in k̄. Therefore, as expected, neither dealers, nor buyers
or sellers benefit from the entry of relatively inefficient dealers. Given that intermediation
is needed, the best solution is to have only the most efficient dealers, those with k = 0,
intermediate all trades. Notice that this is the case because the most efficient dealer charges
the same bid and ask prices independent of the presence of other dealers. This is not true in
a models similar to those in ? and ?, where even the most efficient dealer may wish to lower
their price when other dealers are operating. In the next section we introduce settlement
risk.
4 Settlement risk
In this section we introduce settlement risk for dealers. We define a settlement fail as the
event in which a buyer fails to collect and pay for his buyer order. We assume that this
happens on average with probability λ, so that, on average, a measure λ of buyers will fail to
settle. However, dealers are also subject to an idiosyncratic settlement shock s with support
S = {−1,+1} and probability density Pr[s = −1] = Pr[s = +1] = 1
2
. This settlement
shock describes our notion of counterparty risk: given ε ∈ (0, λ), a dealer experiences a
fraction λ + ε of its buyers failing to settle in state s = −1 and a fraction λ − ε failing
to settle in state s = 1.12 The cost of settlement fails for dealers is that they still have to
honor their obligations toward sellers. The cost of settlement fails for buyers is that they
cannot consume the good. We assume that the settlement shock is i.i.d across dealers and
across time. We interpret an increase (decrease) in dealers’ idiosyncratic settlement risk as
an increase (decrease) in ε.
12We can extend this to a symmetrically distributed ε around [−ε̄, ε̄], where ε̄ < λ and E(ε) = 0. Then
everything below holds with ε = ε̄.
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The decision problems of buyers and sellers are the same as in the previous section, so
that D(a) = (1−a)
N
and S(b) = b
N
. Dealers’ decision problem is:
Π(k;λ, ε) = max
{a,b}
Es {a (1− λ+ sε)D (a)− (b+ k)S (b)} (8)
s.t. (1− λ+ sε)D (a) ≤ S (b) ∀s ∈ {−1, 1} (9)
The resource constraint (??) binds when s = 1. Therefore
S(b) = (1− λ+ ε)D (a) ≡ λεD(a).
Notice that dealers expect to have to deliver (1 − λ)D(a) assets. However, dealers have to
purchase more securities than they expect will be necessary, as they have to satisfy their buy
orders in all possible states. Hence, settlement risk implies that dealers over-buy the asset.
Substituting out for D(a) and S(b) yields:
Π(k;λ, ε) = max
{a}
{a (1− λ)− [λε (1− a) + k]λε}
1
N
(1− a) (10)
Taking the number of operating dealers as given, Figure ?? shows the profits of dealer k as
a function of its ask quote as risk increases from ε = 0 to ε > 0 (Π(k, λ, ε)). The direct
effect of a discrete increase in risk is to reduce dealers’ profits. Hence the curve Π(k, λ, ε)
lies below the curve Π(k, λ, 0). As a consequence, dealers respond by increasing their ask
price (i.e. a′(ε) > 0). The mechanism driving this result is intuitive: If he posts ask price a,
a dealer receives D(a) buy orders but expects only (1 − λ)D(a) buyers to collect the asset
and pay for it. However, he needs to buy sufficient assets to cover effective demand in state
s = 1. Because such demand increases in ε, then an increase in ε reduces dealers’ profits.
To account for the loss in profits, dealers adjust their ask price upwards. As a consequence,
they face fewer buy orders, which, in turn, results in lower effective demand in state s = 1.
The first order conditions to dealers’ decision problem imply:
a(k) = 1− 1− λ− kλε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
=
1− λ+ 2λ2ε + kλε
2(1− λ+ λ2ε)
(11)
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Ε > 0
a ' HΕL > 0
a
PHk, Λ, 0L
PHk, Λ, ΕL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Figure 2: Dealer’s profits as a function of ask price a
b(k) = λε(1− a(k)) = λε
1− λ− kλε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
(12)
It is worth emphasizing the effect of increasing risk on the bid-ask spread. Since the ask
price is increasing with risk, dealers do not need to serve as many buyers as before, so they
should decrease their bid price to purchase a lower quantity of the asset. However, notice
the factor λε which multiplies 1−a(k) in (??): the indirect effect of higher settlement risk is
that dealers have to over-buy the security, which pushes the bid price up. The overall effect
on the bid price is therefore uncertain, and depends on which effects dominates. If λ and ε
are sufficiently small, then the bid price increases in the risk of settlement failure for some
k. Indeed, we have
∂b(k)
∂λε
=
(1− λ)
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
(
1− λ− 2kλε − λ2ε
)
In general, the bid price of a dealer k increases with settlement risk iff:
k <
1− λ− λ2ε
2λε
≡ κ(ε). (13)
Notice that κ(ε) = 0 whenever ε =
√
1− λ
(
1−
√
1− λ
)
. In general, one can easily
prove the following result.
Lemma 1. For all ε ≤ ε̄ ≡
√
1− λ
(
1−
√
1− λ
)
, b(k) is increasing in ε whenever k < κ(ε)
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and decreasing otherwise. For all ε > ε̄ the bid price is always decreasing in ε for all k ≤ k̄.
We can now characterize the demand and supply for each dealer:
D(a) = 1
N
(1− a) = 1
2N
1− λ− kλε
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
(14)
S(b) = 1
N
λε(1− a) =
1
2N
λε
1− λ− kλε
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
(15)
Substituting out for a(k) and b(k) from(??) and (??), as well as N = k̄ in the profit function
of dealer k, we obtain:
Π(k;λ, ε) =
λε(1− λ− kλε)2
4(1− λ) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
(16)
Finally, the marginal active dealer k is such that Π(k̄;λ, ε) = 0, which yields:
k̄ =
1− λ
λε
< 1. (17)
It is then easy to see that a
(
k
)
= 1. In the sequel, we show the main result of this section.
Lemma 2. The dealers’ surplus is decreasing in settlement risk. However, the most efficient
dealers always benefit from an increase in settlement risk iff such risk is sufficiently small.
Proof. See Appendix ??.
Although it may be counterintuitive at first, the result in Lemma ?? relies on the as-
sumption that settlement risk is aggregate in the model: ε is the same for all dealers. Despite
an increase in settlement risk to every dealer negatively affects the profits of every dealer,
as long as it is sufficiently small, its overall effect on the most efficient dealers is positive.
Recall that most efficient dealers process the largest volume of transactions and make the
largest profit per transaction. Thus, they may benefit from an increase in settlement risk if
any losses to the mark-up charged on each transactions are compensated by a larger number
of transactions processed (i.e. they lose profits on the intensive margin but earn on the
extensive margin). This is true iff settlement risk is sufficiently small, otherwise the cost
of accepting additional buy orders which may fail to settle is too large to be covered by an
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increase in the volume of transactions processed.
At the end of this section we return to the intuition behind this result more in detail.
The surplus of buyers now has to take into account that buyers may not obtain the good
if they fail to settle. Therefore, their surplus is scaled down by the probability of being hit
by a settlement fail, λ. In Appendix ?? we show that:
Sb(k̄) = (1− λ)
ˆ 1
a(0)
[ˆ a(k̄)∨v
a(0)
(v − a)
a(k̄)− a(0)
da
]
dv
=
1
6
(1− λ)(1− a(0))2
where a(0) = 1 − 1−λ
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
. Hence, the buyers’ surplus is strictly decreasing with ε.13 The
following Lemma formalizes this result.
Lemma 3. The buyers’ surplus is decreasing with settlement risk.
Finally, using the results in Appendix ??, we compute the surplus of sellers, as
Ss(k̄) =
ˆ b(0)
0
[ˆ b(0)
b(k̄)∧v
(b− v)
b(0)− b(k̄)
db
]
dv =
b(0)2
6
where b(0) = λε
1−λ
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
. Recall that Lemma ?? implies ∂b(0)
∂λε
> 0 for λε small enough,
and ∂b(0)
∂λε
< 0 otherwise. Therefore, the surplus of sellers is increasing when there is little
settlement risk, while it is decreasing otherwise. The following Lemma formalizes this result.
Lemma 4. The sellers’ surplus is increasing with settlement risk whenever ε is small and it
is decreasing otherwise.
We now analyze whether the surplus for the entire economy is increasing in settlement
risk. Hence, we define aggregate surplus as Sd(k̄) + Ss(k̄) + Sb(k̄). It is more convenient to
operate a change of variable to compute the surplus of dealers. In Appendix ?? we show
that Sd(k̄) =
2(1−λ+λ2ε)2
3(1−λ) (1 − a(0))
3. Therefore, using results from Appendix ??, aggregate
13This can be simplified to Sb(k̄) =
1
6
(1−λ)3
4(1−λ+λ2ε)2
.
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surplus is simply:
Sd(k̄) + Ss(k̄) + Sb(k̄) =
2(1− λ+ λ2ε)2
3(1− λ)
(1− a(0))3
+
b(0)2
6
+
1
6
(1− λ)(1− a(0))2
and using b(k) = λε(1− a(k)) and simplifying, we obtain
S ≡ Sd(k̄) + Ss(k̄) + Sb(k̄) =
(1− λ)2
8(1− λ+ λ2ε)
which is strictly decreasing in ε.
The following proposition summarizes the results in the Lemmas ??-??.
Proposition 1. The buyers’ expected surplus is decreasing with settlement risk as measured
by ε. The sellers’ surplus is increasing in ε if ε is small enough, and it is decreasing otherwise.
Aggregate dealers’ surplus is decreasing in ε. However, the most efficient dealers always
benefit from an increase in settlement risk. The overall welfare as measured by the equally
weighted sum of all expected surplus is decreasing in ε.
To conclude this section, we should stress that while it is efficient to reduce risk as much
as possible, this is detrimental to the most efficient dealers. Less risk implies that less efficient
dealers can profitably enter the market, thus making the market tighter for the most efficient
dealers. In the next section, we analyze how these results affect dealers’ decision to adopt a
better market making technology.
5 Model with dealers’ ex-ante fixed investment
In this section we study whether dealers have incentives to invest ex-ante into a technology
that allows them to be more efficient in intermediating transactions between buyers and
sellers. Specifically, we assume that if dealers pay an effort cost γ then they draw their
trading cost from a distribution which places larger probability on more efficient values of
the support.
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Because we interpret the trading cost k as a technology to intermediate transactions
between buyers and sellers, we refer to dealers’ decision to exert effort as dealers’ investment
in the low cost technology. If, on the other hand, dealers do not exert effort then they draw
their trading cost from a distribution with truncated support from the bottom. We refer
to dealers’ decision to not exert effort as dealers not investing, or adopting the high cost
technology.
Intuitively, a dealer gains from becoming ex ante more efficient because he is more likely
to draw a relatively low trading cost k, which results in larger profits from both a larger
bid ask spread and from a larger volume of intermediated transactions. Therefore, dealers
have an incentive to invest in the low cost technology if the effort cost γ is not too large.
Because both buyers and sellers benefit from being matched with more efficient dealers,
dealers ex-ante investment also has benefits on the economy as a whole.14
The introduction of a CCP or of an interdealer market, however, may have the unintended
consequence of reducing dealers’ incentive to invest in the low cost technology, as it allows
more dealers to make positive profits for a given level of counterparty risk (ε). This is due to
a loss of market share by more efficient dealers to less efficient dealers who became profitable
and active. Buyers and sellers, then, may also be worse off because they are less likely to be
matched with efficient dealers and to trade.
5.1 Dealers’ incentives to invest
We modify the benchmark model of the previous sections simply by adding an ex-ante
choice for dealers. Because we want to maintain the tractable characteristics of the model
developed in the previous sections, we maintain the assumption of uniform distribution of
dealers’ trading costs. We model dealers’ choice as follows: if dealers invest ex ante by
paying γ then they draw their trading cost from a uniform distribution on [0, 1], which is
the benchmark model analyzed in the previous sections. If dealers do not pay γ then they
draw their trading cost from a uniform distribution on [km, 1], with km > 0. Therefore
the benchmark model represents the economy with the low cost technology, whereas the
14The fact that dealers do not necessarily rip those benefits turns out to not be crucial, since their incentives
to invest in the low cost distribution is preserved under some assumptions.
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characterization we derive below denotes the equilibrium in the economy with the high cost
technology.
As in the benchmark model the marginal active dealer is the one who makes zero profits.
We let kM ≤ 1 denote the type of such dealer, and
N = kM − km
denote the measure of active dealers. As in the benchmark model, D (a) , S (b) denote the
demand and supply of assets for each dealer when he posts ask price a and bid price b,
Π (k;λ, ε) denote the profits for a dealer with trading cost k and idiosyncratic risk ε ∈ (0, λ)
when buyers exit the economy with probability λ. Thus, with the measure of active dealers
possibly different from the one in the benchmark model, we have, given km > 0,
Π (k;λ, ε) =
1
N
(1− λ− kλε)2
4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
kM = {k ∈ (km, 1) : Π (k;λ, ε) = 0}
Lemma 5. kM = k =
1−λ
λε
.
Proof. It follows from the derivation of k in the benchmark model (??) where N is replaced
by kM − km rather than by k.
Lemma ?? implies that the marginal active dealer is the same regardless of whether the
investment in the low cost technology takes place or not. The reason is simple: the entry
of new dealers only affects the market share of every operating dealer and not their profit
per trade. So whether a dealer makes positive profits or not is independent of investment.
As a result, the marginal active dealer, who makes zero profits, is the same with or without
investment.
The surplus of dealers before they draw their type from U [km, 1] is the conditional ex-
pectation of their profits:
Sd (ε; km) =
ˆ k
km
Π (k;λ, ε)
dk
1− km
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=
{
(1− λ)2N − λε (1− λ)
(
k + km
)
N + λ
2
ε
3
(
k
3 − k3m
)}
N (1− km) 4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
(18)
In equation (??) the relevant distribution of dealers’ transaction costs has been substi-
tuted out. When dealers do not invest in the low cost technology then they draw their k
from a uniform distribution over the support [km, 1], with km > 0. Therefore, the probability
that each dealer draws a specific k ∈ [km, 1] is simply 11−km . In other words, the distribution
of dealers’ transaction costs is truncated at km > 0. As a consequence, dealers’ expected
surplus ex-ante (i.e. before they draw their k) is the integral of a dealer’s profits over the
probability measure 1
1−km . Similarly, with insurance against the idiosyncratic risk (recall
λε = 1− λ+ ε):
Sd (0; km) =
1− λ
4N (1− km) (2− λ)
N (1− k − km)+
(
k
3 − k3m
)
3
 (19)
Let SLd (ε) = Sd (ε; 0) and S
H
d (ε) = Sd (ε; km > 0) denote, respectively, the ex-ante payoff
from investing and not investing in the low cost technology for a given idiosyncratic risk
ε > 0. Then, given ε > 0, dealers have an incentive to invest in the low cost technology iff
the ex-ante payoff from investing, net of the effort cost, exceeds the ex-ante payoff from not
investing and drawing the trade cost from the high cost technology:
SLd (ε)− γ > SHd (ε)
Similarly, with full insurance against idiosyncratic risk, dealers have no incentive to invest
in the low cost distribution if and only if
SLd (0)− γ < SHd (0)
where, similarly to the case where ε > 0, SLd (0) = Sd (0; 0) denotes the dealers’ ex-ante sur-
plus from investing in the low cost technology in an economy with no idiosyncratic risk, and
where SHd (0) = Sd (0; km), with km > 0, denotes the surplus from not investing and drawing
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the trade cost from the high cost technology in the same economy with no idiosyncratic risk.
Therefore, dealers invest in the low cost technology when idiosyncratic risk is not insured
iff the effort cost is sufficiently small, and they do not invest when idiosyncratic risk is insured
iff the effort cost is sufficiently large. The following proposition shows that there exists a
well defined and non-empty set of economies satisfying both of these conditions.
Proposition 2. Given ε ∈ (0, λ], assume km ∈
(
0, k̂
)
with
k̂ =
[
2 (2− λ)λε − (3− λ) (1− λ)− λ2ε
λ2ε − (1− λ)
2
]
(1− λ) (20)
Let
γ1(km, ε) ≡
(1− λ) (2λε − (1− λ)) km − (λεkm)2
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
(21)
γ
1
(km, ε) ≡
(1− λ)
12 (2− λ)
km (22)
Then SLd (ε)− SHd (ε) > γ > SLd (0)− SHd (0) iff
γ1(km, ε) > γ > γ1(km, ε) (23)
Proof. See Appendix ??.
Equation (??) defines an upper bound on km such that there exists a non degenerate set
of economies, indexed by values of γ > 0 satisfying condition (??, in which dealers invest
in the low cost technology in equilibrium iff they are not insured against idiosyncratic risk.
This set of economies includes the equilibrium described in proposition ??. In Appendix
??, we show that such upper bound is never a binding constraint. In particular, we show
that in economies without insurance (i.e. ε > 0) the relevant upper bound on km for the
assumptions in proposition ?? to be satisfied is kε =
1−λ
λε
, while in economies with insurance
(i.e. ε = 0) it is k̂ defined in (??). Thus, because the distribution of active dealers is U [km, kε]
in economies without insurance, then the assumption km < k̂ in proposition ?? is always
satisfied, as kε < k̂ < 1.
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5.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is defined as in the benchmark model, except that dealers now have an
additional decision to make. Before they draw their trading cost k they choose whether to
invest in the low-cost technology, for a given ε. If they do, then they pay a fixed effort cost
γ and draw their k from a uniform distribution over [0, 1], if they do not, then they draw
their k from a uniform distribution over [km, 1], with km > 0.
In the previous section we characterized the set of economies where an equilibrium is such
that dealers prefer to invest in the low-cost technology iff they are not insured against id-
iosyncratic risk. These economies are characterized by intermediate values of the investment
cost γ, as defined by condition (??). The investment cost needs to be sufficiently small to
induce dealers to make the investment when they face idiosyncratic risk, but not too small
so that dealers would still prefer to save on the effort cost when they are insured against
idiosyncratic risk.
Moreover, Proposition ?? shows that if km < k̂ then there always exists γ > 0 such that
(??) is satisfied. Finally, by Lemma ?? in the Appendix k̂ > kε, implying that the relevant
upper bound on km in Proposition ?? is kε. Since km < kε by assumption, then there exists
a non degenerate set of economies, indexed by γ > 0, such that the conditions in Proposition
?? are satisfied. The following proposition formalizes results about existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium in these economies.
Proposition 3. Let γ1 (km, ε) defined in (??) and assume γ1 (km, ε) > γ >
(1−λ)
12(2−λ)km for
km > 0. Then there exists a unique equilibrium such that dealers invest in the low cost
technology iff ε > 0.
Proof. Because γ1 (km, ε) > γ >
(1−λ)
12(2−λ)km by assumption, then condition (??) in proposition
?? are satisfied, implying that SLd (ε)−SHd (ε) > γ > SLd (0)−SHd (0). Thus dealers invest in
the low cost technology iff ε > 0. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium follow from
the same arguments as in the benchmark model of the previous section.
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5.3 Social planner’s investment choice
Consider now the decision problem of a social planner who is constrained by the market
mechanism15 but can choose whether to have dealers pay the cost γ to invest in the low cost
technology technology, which allows dealers to draw their trading cost k from the distribution
U [0, 1] rather than the distribution U [km, 1]. In what follows we are agnostic about the
issue of designing transfers that compensate dealers for their effort when the solution to the
planner’s problem involves paying γ.
We consider the problem of a planner who maximizes the ex-ante welfare of each type of
agent, equally weighted. Thus, for a given ε ≥ 0 the social planner chooses to pay γ iff∑
j=d,b,s
[
SLj (ε)− SHj (ε)
]
> γ.
In the previous section we showed conditions under which dealers choose to pay γ when
ε > 0 but do not when ε = 0. Intuitively, both buyers and sellers benefit from dealers’
investment in the low cost technology, as they are matched with more efficient dealers, those
with transaction cost k ∈ [0, km). Moreover, buyers and sellers benefit also because they are
matched less often with less efficient dealers, as the low cost technology extends the support
of the distribution of transaction costs k, implying a smaller density over each k.
Because a dealer’s efficiency parameter maps into her bid-ask spread and because more
efficient dealers charge smaller bid-ask spreads, then both buyers and sellers gain by dealers
being more efficient on average. When ε > 0 and km satisfies (??), condition (??) implies
that the increase in dealers’ surplus from investing in the low cost technology is sufficient to
compensate them for paying γ. Then it is easy to show that the social planner’s solution also
involves paying γ. When ε = 0, however, the social planner’s allocation involves paying γ
iff the resulting surplus of buyers and sellers more than compensate the decrease in dealers’
surplus net of γ:
SLb (0)− SHb (0) + SLs (0)− SHs (0) > γ −
(
SLd (0)− SHd (0)
)
15That is the social planner is subject to dealers having to intermediate transactions between buyers and
sellers, as they are permanently separated from each other.
23
Because the low cost technology draws dealers from U [0, 1] then SLb (0) and S
L
s (0) are the
same as in the benchmark model. The characterization of the surplus of buyers and sellers
under the high cost technology requires a few additional steps, which are described below.
5.3.1 Buyers’ surplus
In this section we show that buyers always benefit from dealers investing in the low cost
technology. Let ε ≥ 0 be given, and consider buyers’ surplus:
Sb (a, a; ε) =
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[ˆ a
a
ˆ v
a
(v − a) dadv +
ˆ 1
a
ˆ a
a
(v − a) dadv
]
for a = a (km) and a = a
(
k
)
where the ask price function is characterized in (??)
a (k) =
1− λ+ 2λ2ε + kλε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
As in the benchmark model, because a dealer must purchase the asset from sellers before
selling it to buyers, and because a dealer must pay the trading cost for each asset purchased,
then the lowest ask price is offered by the most efficient dealer and the largest by the least
efficient dealer. More efficient dealers make higher profits per transaction, thus they can
afford being paid a lower price per asset sold to a buyer. In Appendix ?? we show that
Sb (a, a; ε) can be rewritten as
Sb (a, a; ε) =
1− λ
6
[
3 + (a+ a) (a− 3) + a2
]
(24)
In Appendix ?? we also show that the increase in the buyers’ surplus from dealers’ investment
in the low cost technology is positive:
SLb (ε)− SHb (ε) = Sb (a (0) , 1; ε)− Sb (a, 1; ε)
=
(1− λ) kmλε
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 [2 (1− λ)− kmλε] > 0 (25)
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where the last inequality follows from 2 (1− λ) > kmλε since ε ∈ (0, λ) and km < 1−λλε = kε.
To ease notation in (??) we let SHb (ε) = Sb (a = a (km) , 1; ε) with km > 0 denote the buyers’
surplus when dealers do not invest in the low cost technology for a given pair km > 0, ε > 0.
Analogously, we let SLb (ε) = Sb (a = a (0) , 1; ε) denote the buyers’ surplus when dealers
invest in the low cost technology, resulting in km = 0, for a given ε > 0. In particular, in the
case where ε = 0, the increase in buyers’ surplus is:
SLb (0)− SHb (0) =
km (1− λ) (2− km)
24 (2− λ)2
(26)
Therefore, (??) and (??) imply that buyers always benefit from the investment in the low
cost technology, for all ε ≥ 0.
5.3.2 Sellers’ surplus
In this section we show that sellers always benefit from the investment in the low cost
technology for all ε ≥ 0. Given ε ≥ 0, the sellers’ surplus is
Ss
(
b, b; ε
)
=
1(
b− b
) [ˆ b
b
ˆ b
v
(b− v) dbdv +
ˆ b
0
ˆ b
b
(b− v) dbdv
]
for b = b
(
kε
)
and b = b (km) where the bid price function is characterized in (??)
b (k) = = λε (1− a (k)) = λε
(1− λ− kλε)
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
As in the benchmark model, the lowest bid price is offered by the least efficient dealer and
the highest by the most efficient dealer. In Appendix ?? we show that Ss
(
b, b; ε
)
can be
rewritten as
Ss
(
b, b; ε
)
=
b
2
+ bb+ b2
6
Notice that b = b
(
kε
)
= 0, since even inefficient dealers can afford to purchase the asset
owned by a seller with valuation v = 0. On the other hand b = b (km) = λε
(1−λ−kmλε)
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
.
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Then, substituting out b = 0 in the sellers’ surplus yields Ss
(
0, b; ε
)
= b
2
6
, with b = b (km).
Because b = 0 regardless of the distribution from which dealers draw their k, then also
SLs
(
0, b; ε
)
= b
2
6
, with b = b (0). The gain in sellers’ surplus when dealers invest in the low
cost technology is then:
Ss (0, b (0) ; ε)− Ss (0, b (km) ; ε) =
b (0)2 − b (km)2
6
.
In Appendix ?? we show that
Ss (0, b (0) ; ε)− Ss (0, b (km) ; ε) =
kmλ
3
ε [2 (1− λ)− kmλε]
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 (27)
where, by feasibility, km < k =
1−λ
λε
. Thus
Ss (0, b (0) ; ε)− Ss (0, b (km) ; ε) >
kmλ
3
ε
[
2 (1− λ)− 1−λ
λε
λε
]
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 > 0 (28)
To ease notation in (??), we define SLs (ε) = Ss (0, b (0) ; ε) as the sellers’ surplus when dealers
invest in the low cost technology, resulting in km = 0, for a given ε > 0. Analogously, we
define SHs (ε) = Ss (0, b (km) ; ε) as the sellers’ surplus when dealers do not invest in the low
cost technology, for a given pair km > 0, ε > 0. Equation (??) implies that when ε = 0 the
gain in sellers’ surplus is
SLs (0)− SHs (0) =
km (1− λ)2 (2− km)
24 (2− λ)2
(29)
Therefore, (??) and (??) imply that sellers always benefit from the investment in the low
cost technology for all ε ≥ 0.
5.3.3 Social planner’s solution
We now analyze the decision problem of a social planner who can choose whether to force
dealers to invest in the low cost technology. We consider two sets of economies: one with
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no idiosyncratic risk (i.e. ε = 0) and one with idiosyncratic risk (i.e. ε > 0). The goal
of this exercise is to inform us about the efficiency of the equilibrium characterized in the
previous section, where dealers invest in the low cost technology iff their idiosyncratic risk
is insured. Intuitively, the equilibrium is efficient if dealers invest in the low cost technology
in equilibrium. In fact, for investment to be part of an equilibrium, it must be that the cost
of investing in the low cost technology is lower than dealers’ net gain from such investment
(γ < SLd (ε) − SHd (ε)). Because (??) and (??) imply that the gain in buyers’ and sellers’
surpluses from dealers’ investment is always positive for all ε > 0, a social planner would also
choose to invest in the low cost technology. Thus the equilibrium is efficient. However, in
equilibrium dealers do not account for the effects of their investment decision on the surplus
of buyers and sellers. So there may be a set of economies where γ is too large for dealers to
invest in the technology, while still sufficiently low for the social planner to prefer investing.
Then, these economies will be inefficient.
Consider first an economy with no idiosyncratic risk (i.e. ε = 0). The solution to the
social planner’s problem is to invest if and only if the sum of the gains in buyers’ and sellers’
surplus exceeds the loss in dealers’ surplus net of the investment cost:
SLb (0)− SHb (0) + SLs (0)− SHs (0) > γ −
[
SLd (0)− SHd (0)
]
Using the characterizations of the gains in agents’ surpluses derived in the previous sections,
this inequality simplifies to:
γ2 (km, 0) ≡
km (1− λ) (4− km)
24 (2− λ)
> γ (30)
where γ2 (km, 0) sets an upper bound on γ. Notice that γ2 (km, 0) is increasing in km, as for
higher values of km the gains from adopting the better technology are higher for all agents,
implying that the planner is willing to pay a higher price for it.16 For all economies such that
γ is too large for dealers to be willing to invest (i.e. γ > γ1 (km, ε) as defined in (??)) but
16This upper bound must be consistent with the upper bound set by (??) for an equilibrium to be also
such that dealers invest in the low cost technology when ε > 0, rather than having dealers never willing
to invest in equilibrium. This is simply to have a trade off between insurance and incentives to invest in
equilibrium.
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sufficiently small for the planner to invest (i.e. γ2 (km, 0) ≥ γ), the equilibrium is inefficient.
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Consider economies where ε = 0. Assume γ > γ
1
(km, ε) and km ∈ (0, k̂),
with k̂ defined in (??). The equilibrium is inefficient if and only if γ2 (km, 0) ≥ γ, with γ2
defined in (??).
Proof. See Appendix ??.
Consider now economies with idiosyncratic risk (i.e. ε > 0). The solution to the social
planner’s problem is to invest if and only if the sum of the gains in buyers’ and sellers’
surplus exceeds the loss in dealers’ surplus net of the investment cost:
SLb (ε)− SHb (ε) + SLs (ε)− SHs (ε) + SLd (ε)− SHd (ε) > γ
In Appendix ?? we show that this can be rearranged as:
γ2 (km, ε) ≡
(1− km) kmλε [2 (1− λ)− kmλε]
24 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
+
(1− λ) km4λε − 2 (1− λ)2 km − 2 (λεkm)2
24 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ (31)
Then the following proposition characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions for invest-
ment in the low cost technology to solve the social planner’s problem.
Proposition 5. Consider economies where ε > 0. The solution to the social planner’s
problem is to invest in the low cost technology iff γ2 (km, ε) ≥ γ.
Proof. It follows from (??).
Now we can compare γ2 (km, ε) with the relevant threshold of γ for dealers to invest in
the low cost technology, γ1 (km, ε), defined in (??). Intuitively, the threshold of γ defining
the maximum effort cost for dealers such that the social planner invests in the low cost
technology should be larger than the threshold of γ above which dealers no longer invest in
the low cost technology. In fact, in the previous sections we showed that the gain in both
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buyers’ and sellers’ surplus from the investment is always strictly positive for all ε ≥ 0.
Because the gain in both buyers’ and sellers’ surplus is relevant for the decision of the social
planner but not for the decision of dealers individually, then it must be that the maximum
effort cost γ such that the social planner invests in the low cost technology, γ2 (km, ε) is larger
than the maximum effort cost such that dealers invest in the low cost technology, γ1 (km, ε).
The following lemma formalizes this intuition.
Lemma 6. γ2 (km, ε) > γ1 (km, ε) for all λ ∈ (0, 1), ε ∈ (0, λ).
Proof. See Appendix ??.
Finally, we can conclude this section with our main result, which is merely a corollary to
Proposition ??.
Corollary 1. Consider economies where ε > 0. This equilibrium is inefficient iff γ2 (km, ε) >
γ > γ1 (km, ε).
Proof. See Appendix ??.
Corollary 1 states conditions under which the economy with risk is inefficient, because
dealers prefer to keep an inefficient market making technology while the planner would rather
have them invest in a better one. Finally, let us stress that Proposition ?? implies that the
economy could be efficient for ε > 0 but inefficient for ε = 0, so that reducing risk can make
a representative investor worse off.
5.4 Average bid-ask spreads
Consider economies where the assumptions of Proposition ?? are satisfied. This guarantees
that, in equilibrium, dealers invest in the low cost technology iff they face some risk (i.e.
ε > 0). With insurance (i.e. ε = 0) dealers do not invest in the low cost technology. This
has consequences for the equilibrium average bid-ask spread observed in the market where
dealers intermediate transactions between buyers and sellers.
In this section we show that, due to the general equilibrium effect of insurance on dealers’
incentives to invest in ex-ante efficient technologies, the impact of central clearing on average
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bid-ask spreads is ambiguous and depends on the ex-ante characteristics of dealers.17 In
particular, comparing the economy with insurance to the economy without, we are able
to characterize a necessary and sufficient condition on dealers’ distribution of transaction
costs for the bid-ask spread to be smaller in the economy with insurance. This requires the
minimum transaction cost for dealers (km) to be sufficiently small. Intuitively, insurance
causes bid-ask spreads to shrink which, in turn, fosters competition by allowing less efficient
dealers to enter the market and be profitable. On the other hand, insurance has a perverse
indirect effect on the incentives of dealers to invest ex-ante in a more efficient technology. As
the ex-ante pool of dealers becomes worse (from [0, k] to [km, 1]), the average bid-ask spread
may increase in equilibrium, as a dealer’s quoted bid-ask spread depends on its transaction
cost, as implied by (??) and (??), with the bid-ask spread decreasing in the efficiency of
a dealer (i.e. the most efficient dealer charges the smallest bid-ask spread). As a result,
the general equilibrium effect of central clearing on bid-ask spreads is negative (i.e. central
clearing is associated with smaller bid-ask spreads) if the first effect dominates. This happens
when the pool of dealers does not become too worse when dealers stop investing in the ex-ante
efficient technology.
The following proposition formalizes this results.
Proposition 6. Maintain the assumptions in Proposition ??. Then average bid-ask spread
is smaller is the economy with insurance and the high cost technology iff:
λ2ε − λε (1− λ)
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
> km (32)
Proof. See Appendix ??.
Proposition ?? is particularly relevant in light of recent empirical findings by ? who
study the effect of central clearing on a measure of transaction-level spreads. They analyze
individually the three phases of mandatory central clearing implementation by the CFTC,
with each phase covering a different category of market participants. ? find that central
clearing is associated with an increase in spreads for swap dealers (Phase 1), while it is asso-
17See Appendix ?? for a characterization of the mapping between a reduction in settlement risk and the
introduction of central clearing.
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ciated with a decrease in spreads for commodity pools (Phase 2) and all other swap market
participants (Phase 3).18 Our results suggest that differences in dealers’ ex-ante character-
istics, such as the support of the distribution of trading costs, are responsible for differences
in bid-ask spreads as the provision of insurance via central clearing affects equilibrium prices
directly and indirectly in opposite directions.
6 Conclusion
Market makers are useful to solve several frictions prevalent in financial markets. In this
paper we concentrated on the effect of search frictions. The presence of frictions in general
implies that market makers can earn a rent. Not surprisingly, this rent is proportional to
a dealer’s efficiency in making market. The more efficient a dealer is the higher his rent.
However, this rent may be declining in the working efficiency of markets. For example,
introducing an insurance against inventory risk (which arises from settlement risk in our
model) can reduce the rent of the most efficient dealers because less efficient dealers can
now operate thus increasing competition. While this looks like a desirable outcome, we
show that this can be detrimental to welfare whenever the decision to be “more efficient”
is endogenous. By lowering the benefit of being better at making markets, technological
innovations in the structure of market can induce market makers to stop investing in better
market making technologies, thus hampering the effects of the innovations. The paper thus
offers a perspective on the opposition of some dealers to the recent pressure for improving
market structures, such as clearing all derivatives traded OTC on central counterparties.
Second, it argues that forcing the adoption of seemingly better market infrastructure has
consequences for the incentives of some market participants, which can adversely impact
other agents. Controlling for these incentives, possibly through transfers, is key to rip the
entire gains from the better market structure.
18See ?, Appendix A.2.1, pg. 669.
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A Derivations
A.1 Derivation of Sd (ε)
Sd (ε) =
ˆ k
km
Π (k;λ, ε)
dk
N
=
1
N24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
ˆ k
km
(1− λ− kλε)2 dk
=
1(
k − km
)2
4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
ˆ k
km
(1− λ− kλε)2 dk
=
1(
k − km
)2
4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
ˆ k
km
(
(1− λ)2 + (kλε)2 − 2 (1− λ) kλε
)
dk
=
1(
k − km
)2
4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{
(1− λ)2
(
k − km
)
− 2 (1− λ)λε
k
2 − k2m
2
+ λ2ε
k
3 − k3m
3
}
=
1(
k − km
)2
4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{
(1− λ)2N − λε (1− λ)
(
k + km
)
N +
λ2ε
3
(
k
3 − k3m
)}
(33)
Thus
Sd (0) =
1
N24 (1− λ) (2− λ)
{
(1− λ)2N − λε (1− λ)
(
k + km
)
N +
(1− λ)2
3
(
k
3 − k3m
)}
=
1− λ
4N2 (2− λ)
N (1− k − km)+
(
k
3 − k3m
)
3
 (34)
A.2 Proof or Lemma ??
Proof. Appendix ?? shows that dealers’ surplus is simply
Sd(ε) =
ˆ k̄
0
Π(k;λ, ε)dk =
1
12
(1− λ)2(
1− λ+ λε2
)
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which is always decreasing in ε. To see that the most efficient dealers benefit from an increase
in settlement risk, notice that (??) implies that the marginal profits for dealer k = 0 are:
∂Π(0;λ, ε)
∂ε
=
(1− λ)
[4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)]2
{
1− λ− λ2ε
}
which is increasing in ε whenever ε is small enough. In fact, the sign of ∂Π(0;λ, ε)/∂ε is the
sign of 1− λ− λ2ε. Hence, for all ε such that ε < ε =
√
1− λ(1−
√
1− λ) the profit of the
most efficient dealer will be increasing.
A.3 Derivation of (??)
Consider SLd (ε)− Sd (ε) > γ . Equation (??) can be rearranged as:
Sd (ε) =
(1− λ)
[
1− λ− λε
(
k + km
)]
4N (1− λ+ λ2ε)
+
λ2ε
(
k
3 − k3m
)
12N2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
=
(1− λ)
[
1− λ− λε
(
1−λ
λε
+ km
)]
4
(
1−λ
λε
− km
)
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
+
λ2ε
(
(1−λ)3
λ3ε
− k3m
)
12
(
(1−λ)
λε
− km
)2
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
= − λεkm (1− λ)
4
(
1−λ
λε
− km
)
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
+
(1−λ)3
λε
− λ2εk3m
12
(
(1−λ)
λε
− km
)2
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
=
1
4
(
1−λ
λε
− km
)
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
−λεkm (1− λ) + (1− λ)3 − λ3εk3m3λε ( (1−λ)λε − km)

=
λε
4 (1− λ− λεkm) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{
(1− λ)3 − λ3εk3m
3 (1− λ− λεkm)
− λεkm (1− λ)
}
(35)
where k = 1−λ
λε
has been substituted out.
Thus SLd (ε)− Sd (ε) > γ iff
(1− λ)2
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
− λε
4 (1− λ− λεkm) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{
(1− λ)3 − (λεkm)3
3 (1− λ− λεkm)
− λεkm (1− λ)
}
> γ
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which can be rewritten as
(1− λ)2 − λε
(1−λ−λεkm)
[
(1−λ)3−(λεkm)3
(1−λ−λεkm) − 3λεkm (1− λ)
]
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ
(1− λ)2 − λε
(1−λ−λεkm)2
[
(1− λ)3 − (λεkm)3 − 3λεkm (1− λ)2 + 3λεkm (1− λ)λεkm
]
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ
(1− λ)2 − λε(1−λ−λεkm)
3
(1−λ−λεkm)2
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ
and which finally yields (??):
(1− λ)2 − λε (1− λ− λεkm)
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ
A.4 Derivation of (??)
Consider γ > SLd (0)−Sd (0). Equation (??) can be rearranged using k = 1−λλε as (??), which,
evaluated at ε = 0 yields:
Sd (0) =
1− λ
4
(
1−λ
λε
− km
)2
(2− λ)

(
1− λ
λε
− km
)(
1− 1− λ
λε
− km
)
+
(1−λ)3
λ3ε
− k3m
3

=
1− λ
4 (1− λ− (1− λ) km)
(
1− λ+ (1− λ)2
) {(1− λ)3 − (1− λ)3 k3m
3 (1− λ− (1− λ) km)
− (1− λ)2 km
}
=
1− λ
4 (1− λ)2 (1− km) (2− λ)
{
(1− λ)3 − (1− λ)3 k3m
3 (1− λ) (1− km)
− (1− λ)2 km
}
=
(1− λ)
4 (1− km) (2− λ)
{
1− k3m
3 (1− km)
− km
}
From the benchmark model SLd (0) is obtained by evaluating dealers’ surplus defined in (??)
at ε = 0, yielding:
SLd (0) =
(1− λ)2
12
(
1− λ+ (1− λ)2
) = (1− λ)
12 (2− λ)
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where k = 1−λ
λε
has been substituted out. Then γ > SLd (0)− Sd (0) is:
γ >
(1− λ)
12 (2− λ)
− (1− λ)
4 (1− km) (2− λ)
{
1− k3m
3 (1− km)
− km
}
=
(1− λ)
4 (2− λ)
{
1
3
− 1
(1− km)
[
1− k3m
3 (1− km)
− km
]}
=
(1− λ)
4 (2− λ)
{
1
3
− 1
(1− km)
[
1− k3m − 3km + 3k2m
3 (1− km)
]}
=
(1− λ)
4 (2− λ)
{
1
3
− (1− km)
3
3 (1− km)2
}
=
(1− λ)
12 (2− λ)
km
A.5 Derivation of k̂
The left hand side of (??) is larger than the right hand side of (??) only if
1
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{
(1− λ)2 − λε (1− λ− λεkm)
}
>
(1− λ)
12 (2− λ)
km
Because (1− λ+ λ2ε) > 0, since λε = 1−λ+ ε and ε ∈ (0, λ), then this can be rearranged as
(2− λ)
{
(1− λ)2 − λε (1− λ− λεkm)
}
> (1− λ)
(
1− λ+ λ2ε
)
km
(2− λ) (1− λ) (1− λ− λε) >
[
(1− λ)2 − λ2ε
]
km
(2− λ) (1− λ) (1− λ− λε) > (1− λ+ λε) (1− λ− λε) km
because (1− λ− λε) < 0 then we can rearranged the last inequality as
(2− λ) (1− λ) < (1− λ+ λε) km
which yields km >
(1−λ)(2−λ)
(1−λ+λε) = k̂.
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A.6 Derivation of k̂ < k
From the definitions of k̂ = (2−λ)
2+ ε
(1−λ)
and k = 1−λ
λε
we have that k̂ < k iff:
(2− λ)λε < 2 (1− λ) + ε
which, using the definition of λε = (1− λ+ ε), can be rearranged as:
2 (1− λ)− λ (1− λ) < 2 (1− λ) + ε (λ− 1)
−λ (1− λ) < −ε (1− λ)
λ > ε
which is always true by the definition of ε ∈ (0, λ).
A.7 Derivation of buyers’ and sellers’ surplus with km
In order to obtain (??) consider the definition of buyers’ surplus:
Sb (a, a; ε) =
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[ˆ a
a
ˆ v
a
(v − a) dadv +
ˆ 1
a
ˆ a
a
(v − a) dadv
]
for a = (km) and a = a
(
k
)
with a (k) = 1−λ+2λ
2
ε+kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
.
Consistently with the results in the previous sections we have Sb
(
k
)
= (1−λ)(1−a(0))
2
6
. This
follows form Sb (a, a; ε) evaluated at a = (0):
Sb (a, a; ε) =
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[ˆ a
a
(
v (v − a)− (v
2 − a2)
2
)
dv +
ˆ 1
a
(
v (a− a)− (a
2 − a2)
2
)
dv
]
=
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[ˆ a
a
(
(v2 + a2)
2
− va
)
dv +
ˆ 1
a
(
v (a− a)− (a
2 − a2)
2
)
dv
]
=
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[
(a3 − a3)
6
− a(a
2 − a2)
2
+
a2
2
(a− a) + (1− a
2)
2
(a− a)− (a
2 − a2)
2
(1− a)
]
=
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[
(a3 − a3)
6
− (a
2 − a2)
2
(a+ 1− a) + (1− (a
2 − a2))
2
(a− a)
]
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=
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[
(a3 − a3)
6
− (a− a) (a+ a)
2
(1− (a− a)) + (1− (a− a) (a+ a))
2
(a− a)
]
= (1− λ)
[
(a3 − a3)
6 (a− a)
+
1− (a− a) (a+ a)− (a+ a) (1− (a− a))
2
]
= (1− λ)
[
(a3 − a3)
6 (a− a)
+
1− (a+ a)
2
]
= (1− λ)
[
(a2 + a2 + aa)
6
+
1− (a+ a)
2
]
=
(1− λ)
6
[
a2 + a2 + aa+ 3− 3 (a+ a)
]
=
(1− λ)
6
[
a (a+ a) + 3− 3 (a+ a) + a2
]
=
(1− λ)
6
[
3 + (a− 3) (a+ a) + a2
]
Evaluating this at a = a (0) and a = a
(
k
)
with a (k) = 1−λ+2λ
2
ε+kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
and k = 1−λ
λε
yields:
a = 1
a =
1− λ+ 2λ2ε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
So that
Sb
(
a (0) , a
(
k
)
; ε
)
=
(1− λ)
6
[
3− 2
(
1 +
1− λ+ 2λ2ε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
)
+
(
1− λ+ 2λ2ε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
)2]
=
(1− λ)
6
[
3− 2
(
3 (1− λ) + 4λ2ε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
)
+
(1− λ+ 2λ2ε)
2
4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
]
=
(1− λ)
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
[
6
(
1− λ+ λ2ε
)
− 2
(
3 (1− λ) + 4λ2ε
)
+
(1− λ+ 2λ2ε)
2
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
]
=
(1− λ)
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
[
(1− λ+ 2λ2ε)
2
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
− 2λ2ε
]
=
(1− λ)
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
[
(1− λ)2 + 4 (1− λ)λ2ε + 4λ4ε − 4λ2ε (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
]
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=
(1− λ)3
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
This is the buyers’ surplus from the low cost distribution, that is the same as in the bench-
mark model.
For the calculation of buyers’ surplus with the high cost distribution we have instead:
Sb
(
a (km) , a
(
k
)
; ε
)
=
1− λ
6
[
3 +
(
a
(
k
)
+ a (km)
) (
a
(
k
)
− 3
)
+ a (km)
2]
using a
(
k
)
= 1 and letting a (km) = a as above, we then have
Sb (a, 1; ε) =
1− λ
6
[
3− 2 (1 + a) + a2
]
=
1− λ
6
[
1− 2a+ a2
]
=
(1− λ)
6
(1− a)2
Using then a (k) = 1−λ+2λ
2
ε+kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
we have
Sb (a, 1; ε) =
(1− λ)
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
[
2
(
1− λ+ λ2ε
)
−
(
1− λ+ 2λ2ε + kλε
)]2
=
(1− λ)
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 (1− λ− kλε)
2
from which it is easy to see that Sb (a, 1; ε) < Sb (a (0) , 1; ε) = S
L
b (ε) for all km > 0. In fact
we have that the difference in buyers’ surplus from investing in the low cost distribution is
SLb (ε)− SHb (ε) = Sb (a (0) , 1; ε)− Sb (a, 1; ε):
SLb (ε)− SHb (ε) =
(1− λ)3
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 −
(1− λ)
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 (1− λ− kmλε)
2
=
(1− λ)
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
[
(1− λ)2 − (1− λ− kmλε)2
]
=
(1− λ) kmλε
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 [2 (1− λ)− kmλε]
which is always strictly positive because 2 (1− λ) > kmλε since ε ∈ (0, λ) and km < 1−λλε .
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Similarly, for sellers, we have that the bid price (??) is
b (k) = λε (1− a (k)) = λε
(
1− 1− λ+ 2λ
2
ε + kλε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
)
= λε
(1− λ)− kλε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
So that b = b (0) = λε(1−λ)
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
and b = b
(
k
)
= 0. Then, sellers’ surplus is
Ss
(
b, b; ε
)
=
1(
b− b
) [ˆ b
b
ˆ b
v
(b− v) dbdv +
ˆ b
0
ˆ b
b
(b− v) dbdv
]
=
1(
b− b
) [ˆ b
b
b
2 − v2
2
− v
(
b− v
)
dv +
ˆ b
0
b
2 − b2
2
− v
(
b− b
)
dv
]
=
1(
b− b
)
b2
2
(
b− b
)
+
(
b
3 − b3
)
6
− b
(
b
2 − b2
)
2
+
(
b
2 − b2
)
2
b− b
2
2
(
b− b
)
=
1(
b− b
)

(
b
2 − b2
)
2
(
b− b
)
+
(
b
3 − b3
)
6
−
(
b− b
) (b2 − b2)
2

=
1(
b− b
)
(
b
3 − b3
)
6
=
b
2
+ bb+ b2
6
=
b
2
6
Then, the gain in sellers’ surplus from dealers’ investment into the low cost technology is
SLs (0, b (0) ; ε)− Ss (0, b (km) ; ε) =
b (0)2 − b (km)2
6
=
(
λε
(1−λ)
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
)2
−
(
λε
(1−λ−kmλε)
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
)2
6
=
λ2ε
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
[
(1− λ)2 − (1− λ− kmλε)2
]
=
λ2ε
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
[
2 (1− λ) kmλε − (kmλε)2
]
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=
λ3εkm
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 [2 (1− λ)− kmλε] > 0
where the last inequality follows from km < k =
1−λ
λε
. In fact
SLs (0, b (0) ; ε)− Ss (0, b (km) ; ε) > SLs (0, b (0) ; ε)− Ss
(
0, b
(
k
)
; ε
)
=
λ3εkm [2 (1− λ)− (1− λ)]
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 > 0.
B Model with ex-ante fixed investment
B.1 Derivation of Sd (ε)
Sd (ε) =
ˆ k
km
Π (k;λ, ε)
dk
(1− km)
=
1
N (1− km) 4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
ˆ k
km
(1− λ− kλε)2 dk
=
1(
k − km
)
(1− km) 4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
ˆ k
km
(1− λ− kλε)2 dk
=
1(
k − km
)
(1− km) 4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
ˆ k
km
(
(1− λ)2 + (kλε)2 − 2 (1− λ) kλε
)
dk
=
1(
k − km
)
(1− km) 4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{
(1− λ)2
(
k − km
)
− 2 (1− λ)λε
k
2 − k2m
2
+ λ2ε
k
3 − k3m
3
}
=
1(
k − km
)
(1− km) 4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{
(1− λ)2N − λε (1− λ)
(
k + km
)
N +
λ2ε
3
(
k
3 − k3m
)}
(36)
Thus
Sd (0) =
1
N (1− km) 4 (1− λ) (2− λ)
{
(1− λ)2N − λε (1− λ)
(
k + km
)
N +
(1− λ)2
3
(
k
3 − k3m
)}
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=
1− λ
4N (1− km) (2− λ)
N (1− k − km)+
(
k
3 − k3m
)
3
 (37)
B.2 Derivation of (??)
Consider SLd (ε)− Sd (ε) > γ . Equation (??) can be rearranged as:
Sd (ε) =
1
(1− km) 4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
(1− λ)2 − λε (1− λ) (k + km)+ λ2ε3
(
k
3 − k3m
)
(
k − km
)

=
1
(1− km) 4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{
(1− λ)2 − λε (1− λ)
(
k + km
)
+
λ2ε
3
(
k
2
+ kkm + k
2
m
)}
Substituting out k = 1−λ
λε
yields
Sd (ε) =
{
(1− λ)2 − λε (1− λ)
(
(1−λ)
λε
+ km
)
+ λ
2
ε
3
(
(1−λ)2
λ2ε
+ (1−λ)
λε
km + k
2
m
)}
(1− km) 4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
=
{
(1− λ)2 − (1− λ)2 − λε (1− λ) km + (1−λ)
2
3
+ λε
3
(1− λ) km + λ
2
ε
3
k2m
}
(1− km) 4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
=
1
(1− km) 4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{
−2λε
3
(1− λ) km +
(1− λ)2
3
+
λ2ε
3
k2m
}
=
1
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{
−2λε (1− λ) km + (1− λ)2 + λ2εk2m
}
=
1
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{
λεkm (λεkm − 2 (1− λ)) + (1− λ)2
}
(38)
Thus SLd (ε)− SHd (ε) > γ iff
(1− λ)2
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
−
{
λεkm (λεkm − 2 (1− λ)) + (1− λ)2
}
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ
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which can be rewritten as
(1− km) (1− λ)2 − λεkm (λεkm − 2 (1− λ))− (1− λ)2
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ
km
− (1− λ)2 − λε (λεkm − 2 (1− λ))
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ
km
2λε (1− λ)− (1− λ)2 − λ2εkm
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ
which is (??).
Just to ease interpretation with respect to the lower extreme on the support of the high
cost technology for dealers, km, we can express (??) as a sufficient condition on km as a
function of γ. To do so, rearrange (??) as
−λ2εk2m +
[
12
(
1− λ+ λ2ε
)
γ + (1− λ) (2λε − (1− λ))
]
km − 12
(
1− λ+ λ2ε
)
γ > 0
which is violated for km = 0, and for km = 1 it becomes
2 > λε (1− λ) = (1− λ)2 + ε (1− λ)
the largest value that the right hand side can take is
(1− λ)2 + λ (1− λ) = (1− λ)
thus the inequality is always satisfied at km = 1 . For km = k it becomes
[
12
(
1− λ+ λ2ε
)
γ − (1− λ)2 + (1− λ) 2λε
] (1− λ)
λε
− 12
(
1− λ+ λ2ε
)
γ − (1− λ)2 > 0[
12
(
1− λ+ λ2ε
)
γ − (1− λ)2
]((1− λ)
λε
− 1
)
> 0
which, because (1−λ)
λε
< 1, is satisfied iff
γ <
(1− λ)2
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
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Then SLd (ε)− Sd (ε) > γ for all km ∈ (k1, k2) with
k1 (γ) =
− [12 (1− λ+ λ2ε) γ + (1− λ) (2λε − (1− λ))]
−2λ2ε
+
−
√
[12 (1− λ+ λ2ε) γ + (1− λ) (2λε − (1− λ))]
2 − 4λ2ε12 (1− λ+ λ2ε) γ
−2λ2ε
k2 (γ) =
− [12 (1− λ+ λ2ε) γ + (1− λ) (2λε − (1− λ))]
−2λ2ε
+
+
√
[12 (1− λ+ λ2ε) γ + (1− λ) (2λε − (1− λ))]
2 − 4λ2ε12 (1− λ+ λ2ε) γ
−2λ2ε
B.3 Derivation of (??)
Consider γ > SLd (0)−Sd (0). Equation (??) can be rearranged using k = 1−λλε as (??), which,
evaluated at ε = 0 yields:
Sd (0) =
1
12 (1− km)
(
1− λ+ (1− λ)2
) {(1− λ) km ((1− λ) km − 2 (1− λ)) + (1− λ)2}
=
(1− λ) (1− 2km + k2m)
12 (1− km) (2− λ)
=
(1− λ) (1− km)
12 (2− λ)
From the benchmark model SLd (0) is obtained by evaluating dealers’ surplus defined in (??)
at km = 0 and ε = 0, yielding:
SLd (0) =
(1− λ)
12 (2− λ)
Then γ > SLd (0)− Sd (0) is:
γ >
(1− λ)
12 (2− λ)
− (1− λ) (1− km)
12 (2− λ)
=
(1− λ)
12 (2− λ)
km
which is (??).
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B.4 Derivation of k̂
The left hand side of (??) is larger than the right hand side of (??) only if
(1− λ) (2λε − (1− λ)) km − (λεkm)2
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
>
(1− λ)
12 (2− λ)
km (39)
Because (1− λ+ λ2ε) > 0, since λε = 1−λ+ ε and ε ∈ (0, λ), then this can be rearranged as
[
(1− λ) (2λε − (1− λ)) km − λ2εk2m
]
>
(1− λ)
(2− λ)
(
1− λ+ λ2ε
) (
km − k2m
)
that can be rewritten as[
(1− λ) (2λε − (1− λ))−
(1− λ)2
(2− λ)
− λ2ε
(1− λ)
(2− λ)
]
km +
(
(1− λ)2
(2− λ)
+ λ2ε
(
(1− λ)
(2− λ)
− 1
))
k2m > 0[
2λε −
(3− λ) (1− λ) + λ2ε
(2− λ)
]
(1− λ) km +
(
(1− λ)2 − λ2ε
(2− λ)
)
k2m > 0(40)
Lemma 7. The first term in square brackets in (??),
[
2λε − (3−λ)(1−λ)+λ
2
ε
(2−λ)
]
, is always posi-
tive.
Proof. Rearrange
[
2λε − (3−λ)(1−λ)+λ
2
ε
(2−λ)
]
as
−λ2ε + 2 (2− λ)λε − (3− λ) (1− λ) > 0
which is satisfied for all λε ∈ (x1, x2) where
x2 =
− (2− λ)−
√
(2− λ)2 − (3− λ) (1− λ)
−1
= (2− λ) +
√
(4− 4λ+ λ2)− 3− 4λ+ λ2
= (2− λ) + 1 = (3− λ) > 1
x1 = (2− λ)− 1 = (1− λ)
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Because λε ∈ ((1− λ) , 1), and because x2 > 1, then it is always the case that λε ∈ (x1, x2).
We use this result in the following argument to characterize the values of km such that
(??) is satisfied.
Let f (k) =
[
2λε − (3−λ)(1−λ)+λ
2
ε
(2−λ)
]
(1− λ) k +
(
(1−λ)2−λ2ε
(2−λ)
)
k2, that is the left hand side of
(??) as a function of k. Then f (k) = 0 for k = k1 = 0 and for k = k2 defined by[
2 (2− λ)λε − (3− λ) (1− λ)− λ2ε
(2− λ)
]
(1− λ) = λ
2
ε − (1− λ)
2
(2− λ)
k2
which can be rewritten as[
2 (2− λ)λε − (3− λ) (1− λ)− λ2ε
λ2ε − (1− λ)
2
]
(1− λ) = k2 (41)
Notice that k2 > 0 because λε > (1− λ) and because, by lemma ??, the numerator in the
definition of k2 is strictly positive.
Thus, (??) is satisfied for any km ∈ (k1, k2), with k1 = 0 and k2 defined in (??). Because
by definition km > 0 then the only relevant constraint on km is km < k2. Let k̂ = k2 defined
in (??) and we have the result.
B.5 Properties of k̂
Lemma 8. Let k̂ be defined in (??) and recall kε =
1−λ
λε
, k0 = 1. Then k̂ ∈ (kε, k0) for all
λ ∈ (0, 1) and ε ∈ (0, λ).
Proof. Consider economies with ε > 0. In this case k = kε =
1−λ
λε
. From (??) and the
definition of k, it follows that k̂ > k iff[
2 (2− λ)λε − (3− λ) (1− λ)− λ2ε
λ2ε − (1− λ)
2
]
(1− λ) > (1− λ)
λε
which, because λ2ε − (1− λ)
2 > 0, can be rearranged as
λε
[
2 (2− λ)λε − (3− λ) (1− λ)− λ2ε
]
> λ2ε − (1− λ)
2
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and further as
[
− (λε − (1− λ))2
]
(λε − 1) > 0
Because by definition of λε we have λε ∈ ((1− λ) , 1) then the above inequality is always
satisfied. Consider now economies with ε = 0. In this case k = k0 = 1. Thus k̂ > 1 iff[
2 (2− λ)λε − (3− λ) (1− λ)− λ2ε
]
(1− λ) > λ2ε − (1− λ)
2
which, substituting out λ2ε1− λ+ ε, simplifies to
(1− λ)2 + 2ε (1− λ) > (1− λ)2 + 2ε (1− λ) + ε2
The above inequality is never satisfied.
B.6 Proof of Proposition ??
Proof. Consider first SLd (ε)−SHd (ε) > γ. Substituting out the equilibrium condition k = 1−λλε
yields
γ1 (km, ε) =
(1− λ) km (2λε − (1− λ))− (λεkm)2
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ (42)
Consider now γ > SLd (0)− SHd (0). Substituting out the equilibrium k = 1−λλε yields
γ >
(1− λ)
12 (2− λ)
km = γ1(km, ε) (43)
Thus, a necessary condition for (??) and (??) to be satisfied is
(1− λ) (2λε − (1− λ)) km − (λεkm)2
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
>
(1− λ)
12 (2− λ)
km (44)
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which can be rearranged as
km <
[
2 (2− λ)λε − (3− λ) (1− λ)− λ2ε
λ2ε − (1− λ)
2
]
(1− λ)
and, more compactly, as km < k̂, with k̂ defined in (??).
19
B.7 Derivation of buyers’ and sellers’ surplus with km
B.7.1 Buyers: low cost technology
In order to obtain (??) consider the definition of buyers’ surplus:
Sb (a, a; ε) =
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[ˆ a
a
ˆ v
a
(v − a) dadv +
ˆ 1
a
ˆ a
a
(v − a) dadv
]
for a = a (km) and a = a
(
k
)
with a (k) = 1−λ+2λ
2
ε+kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
.
Consistently with the results in the previous sections we have Sb
(
k
)
= (1−λ)(1−a(0))
2
6
. This
follows form Sb (a, a; ε) evaluated at a = (0):
Sb (a, a; ε) =
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[ˆ a
a
(
v (v − a)− (v
2 − a2)
2
)
dv +
ˆ 1
a
(
v (a− a)− (a
2 − a2)
2
)
dv
]
=
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[ˆ a
a
(
(v2 + a2)
2
− va
)
dv +
ˆ 1
a
(
v (a− a)− (a
2 − a2)
2
)
dv
]
=
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[
(a3 − a3)
6
− a(a
2 − a2)
2
+
a2
2
(a− a) + (1− a
2)
2
(a− a)− (a
2 − a2)
2
(1− a)
]
=
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[
(a3 − a3)
6
− (a
2 − a2)
2
(a+ 1− a) + (1− (a
2 − a2))
2
(a− a)
]
=
(1− λ)
(a− a)
[
(a3 − a3)
6
− (a− a) (a+ a)
2
(1− (a− a)) + (1− (a− a) (a+ a))
2
(a− a)
]
= (1− λ)
[
(a3 − a3)
6 (a− a)
+
1− (a− a) (a+ a)− (a+ a) (1− (a− a))
2
]
19See Appendix ?? for full derivation of (??), (??) and (??).
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= (1− λ)
[
(a3 − a3)
6 (a− a)
+
1− (a+ a)
2
]
= (1− λ)
[
(a2 + a2 + aa)
6
+
1− (a+ a)
2
]
=
(1− λ)
6
[
a2 + a2 + aa+ 3− 3 (a+ a)
]
=
(1− λ)
6
[
a (a+ a) + 3− 3 (a+ a) + a2
]
=
(1− λ)
6
[
3 + (a− 3) (a+ a) + a2
]
Evaluating this at a = a (0) and a = a
(
k
)
with a (k) = 1−λ+2λ
2
ε+kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
and k = 1−λ
λε
yields:
a = 1
a =
1− λ+ 2λ2ε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
So that
Sb
(
a (0) , a
(
k
)
; ε
)
=
(1− λ)
6
[
3− 2
(
1 +
1− λ+ 2λ2ε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
)
+
(
1− λ+ 2λ2ε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
)2]
=
(1− λ)
6
[
3− 2
(
3 (1− λ) + 4λ2ε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
)
+
(1− λ+ 2λ2ε)
2
4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
]
=
(1− λ)
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
[
6
(
1− λ+ λ2ε
)
− 2
(
3 (1− λ) + 4λ2ε
)
+
(1− λ+ 2λ2ε)
2
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
]
=
(1− λ)
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
[
(1− λ+ 2λ2ε)
2
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
− 2λ2ε
]
=
(1− λ)
12 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
[
(1− λ)2 + 4 (1− λ)λ2ε + 4λ4ε − 4λ2ε (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
]
=
(1− λ)3
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
This is the buyers’ surplus from the low cost distribution, that is the same as in the bench-
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mark model.
B.7.2 Buyers: high cost technology
For the calculation of buyers’ surplus with the high cost technology we have instead:
Sb
(
a (km) , a
(
k
)
; ε
)
=
1− λ
6
[
3 +
(
a
(
k
)
+ a (km)
) (
a
(
k
)
− 3
)
+ a (km)
2]
using a
(
k
)
= 1 and letting a (km) = a as above, we then have
Sb (a, 1; ε) =
1− λ
6
[
3− 2 (1 + a) + a2
]
=
1− λ
6
[
1− 2a+ a2
]
=
(1− λ)
6
(1− a)2
Using then a (k) = 1−λ+2λ
2
ε+kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
we have
Sb (a, 1; ε) =
(1− λ)
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
[
2
(
1− λ+ λ2ε
)
−
(
1− λ+ 2λ2ε + kλε
)]2
=
(1− λ)
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 (1− λ− kλε)
2
from which it is easy to see that Sb (a, 1; ε) < Sb (a (0) , 1; ε) for all km > 0, where, we denote
the buyers’ surplus for a given ε in the economy with the low and high cost technologies,
respectively, as SLb (ε) = Sb (a (0) , 1; ε) and S
H
b (ε) = Sb (a, 1; ε). In fact, the difference in
buyers’ surplus from investing in the low cost technology is SLb (ε)−SHb (ε) = Sb (a (0) , 1; ε)−
Sb (a, 1; ε):
SLb (ε)− SHb (ε) =
(1− λ)3
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 −
(1− λ)
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 (1− λ− kmλε)
2
=
(1− λ)
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
[
(1− λ)2 − (1− λ− kmλε)2
]
=
(1− λ) kmλε
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 [2 (1− λ)− kmλε]
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which is always strictly positive because 2 (1− λ) > kmλε since ε ∈ (0, λ) and km < 1−λλε .
B.7.3 Sellers
Similarly, for sellers, we have that the bid price is
b (k) = λε (1− a (k)) = λε
(
1− 1− λ+ 2λ
2
ε + kλε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
)
= λε
(1− λ)− kλε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
So that b = b (0) = λε(1−λ)
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
and b = b
(
k
)
= 0. Then, sellers’ surplus is
Ss
(
b, b; ε
)
=
1(
b− b
) [ˆ b
b
ˆ b
v
(b− v) dbdv +
ˆ b
0
ˆ b
b
(b− v) dbdv
]
=
1(
b− b
) [ˆ b
b
b
2 − v2
2
− v
(
b− v
)
dv +
ˆ b
0
b
2 − b2
2
− v
(
b− b
)
dv
]
=
1(
b− b
)
b2
2
(
b− b
)
+
(
b
3 − b3
)
6
− b
(
b
2 − b2
)
2
+
(
b
2 − b2
)
2
b− b
2
2
(
b− b
)
=
1(
b− b
)

(
b
2 − b2
)
2
(
b− b
)
+
(
b
3 − b3
)
6
−
(
b− b
) (b2 − b2)
2

=
1(
b− b
)
(
b
3 − b3
)
6
=
b
2
+ bb+ b2
6
=
b
2
6
Let SLs (ε) = Ss (0, b (0) ; ε) and S
H
s (ε) = Ss (0, b (km) ; ε) denote the sellers’ surplus, for a
given ε, in the economy with the low and high cost technologies respectively. Then, the gain
in sellers’ surplus from dealers’ investment into the low cost technology is simply:
SLs (0, b (0) ; ε)− Ss (0, b (km) ; ε) =
b (0)2 − b (km)2
6
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=
(
λε
(1−λ)
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
)2
−
(
λε
(1−λ−kmλε)
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
)2
6
=
λ2ε
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
[
(1− λ)2 − (1− λ− kmλε)2
]
=
λ2ε
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
[
2 (1− λ) kmλε − (kmλε)2
]
=
λ3εkm
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 [2 (1− λ)− kmλε] > 0
where the last inequality follows from km < k =
1−λ
λε
. In fact
SLs (0, b (0) ; ε)− Ss (0, b (km) ; ε) > SLs (0, b (0) ; ε)− Ss
(
0, b
(
k
)
; ε
)
=
λ3εkm [2 (1− λ)− (1− λ)]
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 > 0.
B.8 Proof of Proposition ??
Proof. Inequality (??) defines the upper bound for γ such that the social planner chooses to
invest. Proposition ?? shows that dealers prefer not to invest if γ > γ
1
(km, ε), as derived in
equation (??). Then an equilibrium where dealers are insured against idiosyncratic risk is
inefficient iff γ2 (km, 0) > γ > γ1(km, ε), which can be rearranged as:
km
(1− λ) (4− km)
24 (2− λ)
> γ >
(1− λ)
12 (2− λ)
km
A necessary condition for the existence of γ > 0 such that the above inequality is satisfied
is km
(1−λ)(4−km)
24(2−λ) >
(1−λ)
12(2−λ)km, which is always satisfied since km < k < 1.
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B.9 Proof of Lemma ??
Proof. The left hand side of (??) defines γ2 (km, ε) and (??) defines γ1 (km, ε). So γ2 (km, ε) >
γ1 (km, ε) iff:
(1− km) kmλε [2 (1− λ)− kmλε]
24 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
+
(1− λ) km4λε − 2 (1− λ)2 km − 2 (λεkm)2
24 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
>
(1− λ) (2λε − (1− λ)) km − (λεkm)2
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
which can be rearranged as
(1− km) kmλε [2 (1− λ)− kmλε]
24 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> 0
and is always satisfied because [2 (1− λ)− kmλε] > 0.
B.10 Proof of Corollary ??
Proof. In equilibrium dealers do not invest in the low cost technology, because γ > γ1 (km, ε).
However, because γ2 (km, ε) > γ, the solution to the social planner is to invest. Therefore
the equilibrium is inefficient. Conversely, if the equilibrium is inefficient, it must be that
the social planner chooses to invest, which is the case iff γ2 (km, ε) > γ, as shown in the
proposition ??.
B.11 Derivation of social planner’s investment choice in (??)
In an economy with idiosyncratic risk (i.e. ε > 0) the social planner invests iff:
SLb (ε)− SHb (ε) + SLs (ε)− SHs (ε) + SLd (ε)− SHd (ε) > γ
That is to say
(1− λ) kmλε
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 [2 (1− λ)− kmλε] +
λ3εkm
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 [2 (1− λ)− kmλε] +
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(1− λ) (2λε − (1− λ)) km − (λεkm)2
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ
which can be rearranged as
kmλε [2 (1− λ)− kmλε] [(1− λ) + λ2ε]
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2 +
(1− λ) km2λε − (1− λ)2 km − (λεkm)2
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ
and further as
kmλε [2 (1− λ)− kmλε]
24 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
+
(1− λ) km2λε − (1− λ)2 km − (λεkm)2
12 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ
and
(1− km) kmλε [2 (1− λ)− kmλε]
24 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
+
(1− λ) km4λε − 2 (1− λ)2 km − 2 (λεkm)2
24 (1− km) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
> γ
C Average bid-ask spreads
Proof of Proposition ??.
Proof. The difference between the average bid-ask spread in the economy with the low cost
technology and the average bid-ask spread in the economy with the high cost technologies
is:
sL (0, ε)− sH (km, 0) =
ˆ aL
aL
a
da
aL − aL
−
ˆ aH
aH
a
da
aH − aH
−[ˆ bL
bL
b
db
b
L − bL
−
ˆ bH
bH
b
db
b
H − bH
]
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where aL = aH = 1 and bL = bH = 0 because these are the prices that the least efficient
dealer charges, which is dealer k = k in the economy without insurance and the low cost
technology, and it is dealer k = 1 in the economy with insurance and the high cost technology.
Then the average bid ask spread is
sL (0, ε)− sH (km, 0) =
ˆ 1
aL
a
da
1− aL
−
ˆ 1
aH
a |ε=0
da
1− aH
−[ˆ bL
0
b
db
b
L
−
ˆ bH
0
b |ε=0
db
b
H
]
where a = a (km), with a (k) =
1−λ+2λ2ε+kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
, implies that
aH = a (km, ε = 0) =
(1− λ) + 2 (1− λ)2 + km (1− λ)
2 (1− λ) (2− λ)
=
1 + 2 (1− λ) + km
2 (2− λ)
=
(3− 2λ) + km
2 (2− λ)
where we also used the fact that ε = 0 because there is insurance in the economy with the
high cost technology.
Similarly aL = a (0, ε > 0), which, with with a (k) = 1−λ+2λ
2
ε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
and ε > 0 because there is
no insurance in the economy with the low cost technology, implies that
aL =
1− λ+ 2λ2ε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
=
1
2
+
λ2ε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
Analogously the bid price can be rearranged as: b (k) = λε (1− a (k)) = λε
(
1− 1−λ+2λ
2
ε+kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
)
which, for the economy with the high cost technology and insurance, implies
b
H
= (1− λ) (1− a (km, ε = 0))
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that yields
b
H
= (1− λ)
(
1− aH
)
=
(1− λ) (1− km)
2 (2− λ)
and
b
L
= λε (1− a (0, ε > 0)) = λε
(
1− aL
)
= λε
(
1− 1− λ+ 2λ
2
ε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
)
= λε
(1− λ)
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
Therefore, we have that the difference in average bid ask spreads is
sL (0, ε)− sH (km, 0) =
ˆ 1
aL
a
da
1− aL
−
ˆ 1
aH
a |ε=0
da
1− aH
−
[ˆ bL
0
b
db
b
L
−
ˆ bH
0
b |ε=0
db
b
H
]
=
1−
(
aL
)2
2 (1− aL)
−
(
1−
(
aH
)2
2 (1− aH)
)
−
(
b
L − bH
2
)
=
(
1 + aL
)
2
−
(
1 + aH
)
2
−
(
b
L − bH
2
)
=
aL − aH − bL + bH
2
=
aL − bL −
(
aH − bH
)
2
which is the average between the bid ask spreads charged by the most efficient dealer in the
economies with low and high cost technology. Substituting out from the equilibrium values
for aL, b
L
, aH , b
H
explicitly, the difference in average bid ask spreads is
sL (0, ε)− sH (km, 0) =
1
2
{
1− λ+ 2λ2ε
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
−
(
λε
(1− λ)
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
)}
−1
2
(
1 + 2 (1− λ) + km
2 (2− λ)
− (1− λ) (1− km)
2 (2− λ)
)
=
1
2
{
(1− λ) + 2λ2ε − λε (1− λ)
2 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
− (1 + km)
2
}
55
Then, the average bid ask spread is lower in the economy without insurance but with the
high cost technology iff:
(1− λ) + 2λ2ε − λε (1− λ)− (1− λ+ λ2ε)
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
< km
λ2ε − λε (1− λ)
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
< km
D Central clearing implementation
We consider the simplest implementation of central clearing in the model of Section ??, which
we modify simply by introducing a continuum [0, 1] of dealers for each type k. Notice that this
modification leaves all the derivations and results in the previous sections unchanged. If all
dealers clear their transactions centrally via a Central Counterparty (CCP), then they must
post collateral in the form of (margins, default fund contributions, and) default assessment.
20 Because the settlement shock ε is i.i.d. across dealers in each period, then it is i.i.d. also
across the [0, 1] continuum of dealers of a given type k.
Suppose that all dealers are insured against the settlement shock ε, as we later verify.
Therefore, they post bid and ask prices under the expectation that they face no such shock
and that only a fraction λ of buyers will fail to settle their buy orders. This is equivalent
to a version of the model with no settlement risk, described in Section ??, with the only
difference being λ 6= 0. Let a(k), b(k) denote the ask and bid prices posted by dealers of
type k, and let D(a(k)), S(b(k)) denote the demand and supply for the asset which dealers
of type k face from buyers and sellers respectively. Consistently with the analysis carried out
in Section ??, each dealer chooses a(k), b(k) to maximize expected profits Π(k) subject to
the feasibility constraint (1− λ)D(a(k)) = S(b(k)). As in Section ??, if a dealer posted ask
and bid prices a, b then its demand and supply, at the stage where buy and sell orders are
20For a description of the risk management practices of CCPs see ?, and, for examples of default waterfall
in CCPs currently operating in OTC markets, see ?, ?, ?, ? and ?. For a rigorous modeling of the economic
functions of a CCP, among which insurance against counterparty risk, see ?, ?, ?, ? and ?.
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placed, satisfy D(a) = (1−a)
N
and S(b) = b
N
. Then, a dealer with transaction cost k chooses
a, b to solve:
Π(k) = maxa,b {a(1− λ)D(a)− (b+ k)S(b)} (45)
s.t. (1− λ)D(a) ≤ S(b) (46)
As in Section ??, the feasibility constraint yields b = (1− λ)(1− a), which substituted back
into the objective function yields:
Π(k) = max
a
{a(2− λ)− k − (1− λ)} (1− λ)D(a) (47)
Substituting out for D(a) and taking first order conditions yields:
a(k) =
3 + k − 2λ
2(2− λ)
(48)
b(k) =
(1− λ)(1− k)
2(2− λ)
(49)
After the settlement shock is realized, a measure 1
2
of dealers of type k receives shock
s = −1 and its effective demand for the asset is (1 − λ − ε)D(a(k)). Let S1(k) denote the
set of such dealers. Analogously, a measure 1
2
of dealers of type k receives shock s = 1 and
its effective demand for the asset is: (1 − λ + ε)D(a(k)). Let S2(k) denote the set of such
dealers. Finally, let dk(s) denote the default assessment of dealer k towards the CCP when
its idiosyncratic state is s, where dk : {−1,+1} → R. 21 Under the rules of a CCP default
waterfall, clearing members must contribute financial resources, so-called assessments, when
necessary to avoid the CCP’s default on any given position. Thus, a dealer i ∈ S1(k) faces
effective demand (1 − λ − ε)D(a(k)), but purchased S(b(k)) = (1 − λ)D(a(k)) assets from
sellers. As a consequence, such a dealer holds an excess of εD(a(k)) assets purchased from
sellers and unsold to buyers. On the contrary, a dealer j ∈ S2(k) faces effective demand
21Notice that, because we have no collateral in the model, the default fund contribution by each CCP
member takes place ex-post. In this respect the contribution is more similar to a default assessment, which
usually occur after the margins and default fund contributions of defaulting and non-defaulting members
have already been utilized.
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(1 − λ + ε)D(a(k)), but purchased only S(b(k)) = (1− λ)D(a(k)) assets from sellers. As a
consequence, such a dealer does not hold a sufficient inventory of assets to serve all of its
buyers, and is short εD(a(k)) assets. The CCP assessment mechanism can then insure both
dealers ex-ante, by charging dealers i ∈ S1(k) an assessment dk(−1) = εD(a(k)) and dealers
j ∈ S2(k) an assessment dk(+1) = −εD(a(k)). In other words, the former dealer makes a
transfer of εD(a(k)) assets to the latter. This process is described in Figure ??.
Dealer	  k	  
Buyers:	  D(a)	   Sellers:	  S(b)	  
Dealer	  k	  
Buyers:	  D(a)	   Sellers:	  S(b)	  
Nova4on	   Nova4on	  
€ 
S(b)
−εD(a)
€ 
S(b)
+εD(a)
€ 
εD(a)
Buyers	   Sellers:	  S(b)	   Buyers:	   Sellers:	  S(b)	  
€ 
(1− λ −ε )D(a)
€ 
(1− λ +ε )D(a)
CCP	  
Figure 3: Implementation of central clearing in the model
In order to verify that (??) and (??) are indeed dealers’ optimal response to the default
assessment rule dk, notice that dealers’ k feasibility constraint in state s = −1 and s = 1
are, respecticely:
(1− λ− ε)D(a) = S(b)− dk(−1) = S(b)− εD(a)
(1− λ+ ε)D(a) = S(b)− dk(+1) = S(b) + εD(a)
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Notice that the feasibility constraints (??) boil down to (??) independent of the value of the
settlement shock s. Moreover, the objective function (??) is simply:
Π(k;λ, ε) = Es{a(1− λ+ sε)D(a)− (b+ k)S(b)} (50)
Since Ess = 0 then the objective function of dealers k is simply (??). Therefore, the solution
to dealers’ k maximization problem yields (??) and (??).
E Risk aversion
We now consider the case where traders are risk averse in the following sense: The surplus
from trade of a buyer is x = v − a(k) whenever he accepts the bid price a(k). Similarly the
surplus from trade of a seller is x = b(k)− v. We assume that traders value the surplus from
trade according to a CRRA utility function,
u(x) =
(x+ c)1−σ − c1−σ
(1− σ)
,
where σ > 1 and c > 0 is small. We need c > 0 so that traders prefer to trade than to exit
the market without searching.22 This specification implies that their decision to accept a bid
or an ask price is the same as in the previous section. Therefore, the optimal bid and ask
prices set by dealers (??)-(??) are unchanged. As a consequence, the least efficient dealer in
operation is still k̄ defined by (??). Also, the effect of settlement risk on the bid-ask prices
is unchanged: Increased settlement risk makes entry less profitable so that the least efficient
dealers exit the market. As a consequence, the distribution of ask-prices becomes more
concentrated. While they face higher ask price, buyers face a lower dispersion of ask price.
Since they are risk averse, they may prefer that dealer face a little more risk. Obviously,
buyers face a trade-off as on one hand they face a higher average ask-price, but on the other
hand, the distribution of ask price is more compressed.
22This is the case if σ > 1 as x1−σ/(1 − σ) < 0 for all x ≥ 0, and this affects the decision of traders to
accept or reject an offer.
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Buyers’ welfare with c > 0 is:
Ub =
(1− λ)
(1− σ)
{
(1− a(0) + c)3−σ − c3−σ
(1− a(0)) (2− σ) (3− σ)
− c
1−σ
2
(1− a(0))− c
2−σ
2− σ
}
Hence, we obtain
∂Ub
∂ε
=
(1− λ)
(1− σ)
{
− (1− a(0) + c)
2−σ
(1− a(0))(2− σ)
+
(1− a(0) + c)3−σ − c3−σ
(1− a(0))2(2− σ)(3− σ)
+
c1−σ
2
}
∂a(0)
∂ε
Computation with different values for σ reveals that the payoff of buyers is always decreasing
with an increasing in settlement risk. Therefore, concavity of the buyer’s payoff function
is not enough to generate the desirability of settlement risk. We turn next to different
distribution of the dealers’ cost.
E.1 Distribution function for dealers transaction cost
In this section of the paper we assume that dealers are distributed according to a beta
probability distribution f (k;α, β) = αk
α−1(1−k)β−1
B(α,β) with support [0, 1]. Let β = 1 so that
B (α, β) = 1. Then the cdf associated with it is
F (k) =
ˆ k
0
αsα−1ds = kα
Now, because only k = 1−λ
λε
< 1 are active, then23
Fk (k) =
kα
k
α
and the probability distribution function is then simply fk (k) = α
kα−1
k
α .
Notice that ask prices are an affine transformation of the dealer’s cost of the form a(k) =
23Or, similarly, from F (k) = kα we have that the truncated distribution Fk (k) = Pr
(
s ≤ k | s ≤ k
)
=
Pr(s≤k∩s≤k)
Pr(s≤k)
= F (k)
F(k)
.
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a(0) + ξk where a(k̄) = 1 and ξ = λε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
, then the cdf of a (k) is derived from Fk (k):
Fa (â) =
(
â−a(0)
ξ
)α
k
α
fa (a) =
1
ξ
fk̄
(
a− a(0)
ξ
)
Similarly for the bid price
b (k) = b (0)− λεξk
And
Fb
(
b̂
)
= 1−
(
b(0)−b̂
λεξ
)α
k
α
fb (b) =
1
λεξ
fk̄
(
b (0)− b
λεξ
)
E.2 Buyers’ surplus
Then buyers’ surplus (with linear preferences), using integration by parts, is:
Sb =
ˆ 1
a(0)
[ˆ v
a(0)
(v − a)fa(a)da
]
dv
=
(1− a (0))α+2
ξαk
α
(α + 1) (α + 2)
Using a(k) = 1− 1−λ−kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
, ξ = λε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
and k = 1−λ
λε
we then have:
Sb =
(
1−λ
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
)2
(α + 1) (α + 2)
which is decreasing in ε. Also notice that the smaller α is the faster Sb decreases in ε.
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E.3 Sellers’ surplus
Similarly for sellers’ surplus, using integration by parts:
Ss =
ˆ b(0)
0
[ˆ b(0)
v
(b− v)fb(b)db
]
dv
=
b (0)α+2
(α + 1) (α + 2)
(
λεξk
)α
Using b(k) = λε
1−λ−kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
we then have:
Ss = λ
2
εSb
which is increasing24 in ε iff ε ∈ [0, ε] (where ε = − (1− λ) +
√
1− λ as defined above). Also
notice that the smaller α is the faster Ss increases in ε.
E.4 Dealers’ surplus
For dealers let us rewrite the expected demand and supply faced in their decision problem:
D (a) =
ˆ rc
a
h̃ (r) dr
24Where
∂Ss
∂ε
=
(1− λ)2
4 (α+ 1) (α+ 2)
∂
(
λε
(1−λ+λ2ε)
)2
∂ε
=
(1− λ)2
4 (α+ 1) (α+ 2)
2λε
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
(
1− λ+ λ2ε − 2λ2ε
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
)
=
λε (1− λ)2
2 (α+ 1) (α+ 2)
(
1− λ− λ2ε
)
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
3
which is always strictly positive iff ε is such that 1− λ− λ2ε > 0.
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where h̃ (r) is the conditional probability density of buyers’ reservation prices among the
fraction 1 − vc who chose to participate in the dealers’ market. Therefore, h̃ (r) is derived
as follows: the reservation price of a buyer with valuation v, denoted rc (v), is simply that
specific buyer’s valuation:
rc (v) = v
Now, v ∼ U [vc, 1] therefore
Pr (rc (v) ≤ r) = Pr (v ≤ r)
=
r − vc
1− vc
and the probability density function associated with it is simply h (r) = 1
1−vc
. Then the
per dealer k density of buyers is (1− vc) fk (k)h (r). So that the mass of buyers who place
an order when the ask price they face is a (i.e. demand faced by a dealer who posts ask
price a if his type is k -because here the mass of buyers that contact him is a function of k)
is simply
D (a (k)) =
ˆ rc
a(k)
(1− vc) fk (k)h (r) dr
= (1− a (k)) fk (k)
And similarly for the supply:
S (b (k)) = b (k) fk (k)
For dealers, we also need to take into account the constraint of meeting demand period by
period, so that substituting the expected demand and supply per dealer k into the objective
function of a dealer we have, as before, that expected profits of dealer k with the optimal
choice of a, are
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π (k;λ, ε) = fk (k) {a (k) (1− λ)− [λε (1− a (k)) + k]λε} (1− a (k))
= α
kα−1
k
α
(1− λ− kλε)2
4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
Then aggregate dealers’ surplus is given by the total discounted profits of all dealers partic-
ipating in the dealer market are:
Sd(ε) =
ˆ k̄
0
Π(k;λ, ε)dk
=
1
4 (α + 1) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{(
1− λ− λεk̄
) [
(α + 1) (1− λ) + [2λε − (α + 1)λε] k̄
]
+
2λ2εk̄
2
(α + 2)
}
And using k = 1−λ
λε
we then have:
Sd =
(1− λ)2
2 (α + 1) (α + 2) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
Also notice that the smaller α is the faster Sd decreases in ε.
Overall we have the following result:
Claim 1. Sd decreases in ε. The smaller α is the larger is the decrease in Sd. Ss increases in
ε, for ε ∈ [0, ε], and decreases in ε, for ε ∈ [ε, λ]. The smaller α is the larger is the increase
(decrease) in Sd. Sb is decreasing in ε. The smaller α is the faster Sb decreases in ε.
E.5 Total welfare
Summing up buyers’, sellers’ and dealers’ welfare we have:
W = Sb + Ss + Sd
=
(1− λ)2 (3 + 3λ2ε − 2λ)
4 (α + 1) (α + 2) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
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And:
∂W
∂ε
=
(1− λ)2 λε
2 (α + 1) (α + 2)
(λ− 3 (1 + λ2ε))
(1− λ+ λ2ε)
3
which is always negative since
λ− 3
(
1 + λ2ε
)
< 0
Claim 2. Total welfare is always decreasing in ε regardless of the value of α.
E.6 Different parameters for B (α, β)
In this section of the paper we assume that dealers are distributed according to a beta
probability distribution f (k;α, β) = βk
α−1(1−k)β−1
B(α,β) with support [0, 1]. Let α = 1 so that
f (k;α, β) = β (1− k)β−1 and the cdf associated with it is
F (k) = 1− (1− k)β
Now, because only k = 1−λ
λε
< 1 are active, then25
Fk (k) =
1− (1− k)β
1−
(
1− k
)β
and the probability distribution function is then simply fk (k) = β
(1−k)β−1
1−(1−k)
β .
Notice that ask prices are an affine transformation of the dealer’s cost of the form a(k) =
a(0) + ξk where a(k̄) = 1 and ξ = λε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
, then the cdf of a (k) is derived from Fk (k):
Fa (â) =
1−
(
1− â−a(0)
ξ
)β
1−
(
1− k
)β
25Or, similarly, from F (k) = kα we have that the truncated distribution Fk (k) = Pr
(
s ≤ k | s ≤ k
)
=
Pr(s≤k∩s≤k)
Pr(s≤k)
= F (k)
F(k)
.
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fa (a) =
1
ξ
fk̄
(
a− a(0)
ξ
)
Similarly for the bid price
b (k) = b (0)− λεξk
And
Fb
(
b̂
)
=
(
1− b(0)−b̂
λεξ
)β
−
(
1− k
)β
1−
(
1− k
)β
fb (b) =
1
λεξ
fk̄
(
b (0)− b
λεξ
)
E.6.1 Buyers’ surplus
Then buyers’ surplus (with linear preferences), using integration by parts, is:
Sb =
ˆ 1
a(0)
[ˆ v
a(0)
(v − a)fa(a)da
]
dv
=
1− a(0)[
1−
(
1− k
)β] (1− a(0)2 − ξβ + 1
)
−
ξ
β+1
ξ
β+2[
1−
(
1− k
)β]
[(
1− 1− a(0)
ξ
)β+2
− 1
]
And using a(k) = 1 − 1−λ−kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
, ξ = λε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
and k = 1−λ
λε
we then have that for
λ = 0.3, β = 0.2 buyers’ surplus as a function of ε is increasing for small values of ε, as
Figure ?? shows.
Let ε∗ denote the threshold such that ∀ε ≤ ε∗ we have that ∂Sb
∂ε
> 0 and ∀ε > ε∗ we have
that ∂Sb
∂ε
< 0. Then as β > 0 decreases we have that ε∗ increases. Also, for the same value
of β, ε∗ is decreasing in λ. Figure ?? shows Sb as a function of ε for λ = 0.1, β = 0.2.
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Figure 4: buyers’ surplus as a function of
ε: λ = 0.3, β = 0.2
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
0.0048
0.0050
0.0052
0.0054
0.0056
0.0058
Figure 5: buyers’ surplus as a function of
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And substituting out a(k) = 1− 1−λ−kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
, ξ = λε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
and k = 1−λ
λε
we then have that:
Sb =
(β + 2) (1− λ) (β + 1) (1− λ)− 2λ2ε
(
1− 1−λ
λε
)β+2
+ 2λε (λε − (β + 2) (1− λ))
8 (β + 1) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
[
1−
(
1− 1−λ
λε
)β]
(β + 2)
The whole positive effect of ε comes from
[
1−
(
1− 1−λ
λε
)β]
at the denominator which is
coming form k through the distribution of ask prices. Figure ?? shows the pdf of the ask
price, fa (a), for β = 0.2, λ = 0.3, ε = 0.02. Notice that when ε increases, the mass on every
surviving dealer increases. Figure ?? shows the pdf of the ask price, fa (a), for β = 0.2, λ =
0.3, ε = 0.05. Figure ?? shows the pdf of the ask price, fa (a), for β = 0.2, λ = 0.3, ε = 0.2.
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E.6.2 Sellers’ surplus
Similarly for sellers’ surplus, using integration by parts:
Ss =
ˆ b(0)
0
[ˆ b(0)
v
(b− v)fb(b)db
]
dv
=
1[
1−
(
1− k
)β]
{
b(0)2
2
− λεξ
β + 1
b(0) +
λεξ
β + 1
λεξ
β + 2
[
1−
(
1− b (0)
λεξ
)β+2]}
Using b(k) = λε
1−λ−kλε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
, ξ = λε
2(1−λ+λ2ε)
and k = 1−λ
λε
,we then have:
Ss =
λ2ε[
1−
(
1− 1−λ
λε
)β] (β + 1) (1− λ)
2 + 2λ
2
ε
(β+2)
(
1−
(
1− 1−λ
λε
)β+2)
− 2λε (1− λ)
4 (β + 1) (1− λ+ λ2ε)
2
Interestingly, also the sellers’ surplus is decreasing in ε for large values of β: for example for
β = 2, λ = 0.3 it is decreasing, but for β = 1, λ = 0.3 it is hump shaped with a threshold
ε∗such that ∀ε ≤ ε∗we have that ∂Ss
∂ε
> 0 and ∀ε > ε∗we have that ∂Ss
∂ε
< 0. As in the buyers’
surplus case, as β > 0 decreases we have that ε∗ increases. Figure ?? shows sellers’ surplus,
Ss, as a function of ε when β = 0.7, λ = 0.1. Notice that for sufficiently small values of λ
sellers’ surplus is strictly increasing in ε, while for sufficiently large values of λ, as long as
β is small enough, then sellers’ surplus is hump shaped as a function of ε. Figure ?? shows
sellers’ surplus Ss as a function of ε when β = 0.7, λ = 0.9. In order to gain insight on what
is going on with the distribution of bid prices, Figure ?? shows the pdf of the bid price,
fb (b), for β = 0.2, λ = 0.3, ε = 0.02.
Therefore there is a lot of mass on inefficient dealers so that when they exit all that mass
gets thrown onto more efficient dealers: recall that more efficient dealers are the ones who
charge the highest (lowest) bid (ask) price because they are the only ones who can afford
to do so. Therefore the above picture means that few dealers (the efficient ones) charge the
highest bid prices, whereas many dealers (the inefficient ones) charge the lowest bid prices.
Notice that when ε increases, the mass on bid prices offered by very efficient dealers
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increases. Figure ?? (red) shows the pdf of fb (b) for β = 0.2, λ = 0.3, ε = 0.02 and Figure
?? (green) for β = 0.2, λ = 0.3, ε = 0.05.
Notice that b = 0 is unchanged because it is the bid price quoted by the marginal
operating dealer (which is making zero profits); however b increases with ε because it is the
bid price quoted by the most efficient dealer whose demand and supply change as ε increases
because there are less dealers who are active (since k decreases). Therefore the most efficient
dealer is more likely to get a random call by a buyer and a seller (fk (k = 0) increases) and
he is efficient enough that it is profitable for him to increase the bid price and serve a larger
share of the market.
E.6.3 Dealers’ surplus
If we take into account that expected demand and supply are D (a) = (1− a (k)) fk (k) and
S (b (k)) = b (k) fk (k)then expected profits are π (k;λ, ε) = β
(1−k)β−1
1−(1−k)
β
(1−λ−kλε)2
4(1−λ+λ2ε)
. Either way
we know that the calculation of aggregate dealers’ surplus is the same regardless of which
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Figure 12: fb (b): β = 0.2, λ = 0.3, ε = 0.02
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Figure 13: fb (b): β = 0.2, λ = 0.3, ε = 0.05
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interpretation we give (matching or probability). Therefore aggregate dealers’ surplus is:
Sd(ε) =
ˆ k̄
0
Π(k;λ, ε)dk
=
(1− λ)(
1−
(
1− k
)β)
4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
{
(1− λ)− 2λε
β + 1
+
(
2λεk̄ − (1− λ) +
2λε
β + 1
(
1− k̄
)) (
1− k̄
)β}
+
+
λ2ε(
1−
(
1− k
)β)
4 (1− λ+ λ2ε)
 2(β + 1) (β + 2) − (1− k̄)β
k̄2 + 2
((
1− k̄
)2
+ (β + 2)
(
1− k̄
)
k̄
)
(β + 1) (β + 2)

Dealers’ surplus for a given λ is inverse U-shaped in ε: in general the smaller λ the larger
the value of β∗, where β∗ =
{
β > 0 : ∂Sd
∂ε
> 0,∀β < β∗
}
. For a given λ, as we increase β the
peak of the inverse U shaped function is reached at a value ε̂ < 0; analogously for β small
the peak of the inverse U shaped function is reached at a value ε̂ > λ, therefore in these two
polar cases we have that dealers’ surplus is either decreasing, increasing or hump-shaped in
any feasible value of ε ∈ [0, λ], as we can see from the figures below.
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g2k = H1 - lL - H2 lame Hb + 1LL + H2 lame kbar - H1 - lL + 2 lame H1 - kbarL  Hb + 1LL H1 - kbarL^b;
g3k = lame^2 HH1 - H1 - kbarL^b L 4 H1 - l + lame^2LL;
g4k = 2  HHb + 1L Hb + 2LL -
H1 - kbarL^b Hkbar^2 + 2 HH1 - kbarL^2 + Hb + 2L kbar H1 - kbarLL  HHb + 1L Hb + 2LLL;
Plot@g1k g2k + g3k g4k, 8e, 0, l<D
Out[122]= e
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Figure 15: Sd(ε): β =
0.2, λ = 0.1
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lame-2-b Ilame2+b + HH1 + bL H-1 + lL - lameL H-1 + l + lameL1+bM
H1 + bL H2 + bL

lame-2-b Ilame2+b + HH1 + bL H-1 + lL - lameL H-1 + l + lameL1+bM
H1 + bL H2 + bL
In[127]:= kbar = H1 - lL  H1 - l + eL;
l = 0.3;
b = 0.2;
lame = 1 - l + e;
g1k = H1 - lL  HH1 - H1 - kbarL^b L 4 H1 - l + lame^2LL; e
g2k = H1 - lL - H2 lame Hb + 1LL + H2 lame kbar - H1 - lL + 2 lame H1 - kbarL  Hb + 1LL H1 - kbarL^b;
g3k = lame^2 HH1 - H1 - kbarL^b L 4 H1 - l + lame^2LL;
g4k = 2  HHb + 1L Hb + 2LL -
H1 - kbarL^b Hkbar^2 + 2 HH1 - kbarL^2 + Hb + 2L kbar H1 - kbarLL  HHb + 1L Hb + 2LLL;
Plot@g1k g2k + g3k g4k, 8e, 0, l<D
Out[131]= e
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Figure 16: Sd (ε): β =
0.2, λ = 0.3
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